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PREFACE 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but 
from their regard of their own interest. We ad-
dress ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their 
self-love, and never talk to them of our own neces-
sities but of' their advantages. Nobody but a begger 
chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of 
his fellow citizens (1). 
And, so, in less harsh terms, the genesis of this 
thesis lies, firstly , in the goal accomplishment aims of 
the manager and, secondly, in the attainment of such goals 
through the allocation of scarce resources to the contribu-
tors of the organization. 
In conducting the preliminary research on utility 
theory, there was no one reference source available that 
compressed the present state of the art, nor could the 
source be extended to a few outstandi ng works. Rather, the 
research covered over two hundred articles and books in 
establishing the current development level in this research 
area. As a consequence , the extensive citations presented 
are, hopefully, to accomplish two purposes. The first pur-
pose is to document the development and application of 
utility theory in the allocation of scarce resources. The 
second purpose is to furnish a selected bibliography of the 
important contributions in utility the.ory so that this 
iii 
research may serve as a teaching a i d as well a s t he intende d 
purpose of research. The b i bliographic references should 
conceivably reduce redundant literature search in any exten-
sion of this work. 
Returning to Graduate School after eight and one-half 
years in industry was no lightly weighed decision. The firm 
push came from a company sponsored school at Princeton, 
New Jersey, where I felt humbled by the perspective of "what 
I didn't know," and soon thereafter came the decision to try 
for a more formal approach in the search for the techniques 
and tools of management. And, in this search a deep debt of 
gratitude is due most particularly to H. G. Thuesen , Profes-
sor and Head Emeritus , School of Industrial Engineering and 
Management, for pointing the way, in my undergraduate course 
in Engineering Economy , to a philosophy of learning both in 
and out of the classroom. Unfortunately , his retirement 
last year prevented his serving on my Graduate Committee; 
however, he did give , in immeasurable ways , guidance and 
counsel when paths looked rocky and forbidding. I look back 
to his counsel -- hopefully , look forward to more - - and re-
gret only that his presence in the classroom will be lost to 
those who follow. Professor Thuesen sti mulated me t o seek 
answers surrounding the subjective areas of management. For 
my opportunity to study under his tutelage , I am forever 
indebted. 
My deep debt to Professor Wilson J. Bentley , Head of 
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the School of Industrial Engineer.ing and Management and 
Chairman of my Graduate Committee, who started all this by 
saying "Come ahead-- you can do it.", f ,)r his encouragement, 
his faith, his counsel, and for his particular ability to 
offer a measure of challenge, is sincerely acknowledged. 
To a friend and master tutor, Professor Paul E. 
Torgersen, who provided a great amount of counsel and guid-
ance, and provided the impetus to search for an objective 
measure of organization behavior, my debt is hardly less. 
To the other members of my committee: Professors 
Ansel M. Sharp, J. Leroy Folks, and James E. Shamblin, my 
debts are deep and sincere. Their guidance and advice pro-
vided the touch-stones to connect logical reasoning with 
logical results. 
No small debt of gratitude is due to the many others 
who provided the atmosphere and learning opportunity at 
Oklahoma State University; special recognition is due 
Professors Wolter J. Fabrycky and Luther G. Tweeten for 
their many helpful ideas and suggestions in narrowing down 
the gap of uncertainty over which all decision-makers must 
jump. 
The financial assistance supplied through the Ford 
Foundation Forgivable Loan program aided significantly in 
allowing full-time devotion to graduate studies. 
To Miss Velda Davis, I pay special tribute for more 
than the deciphering of atrocious handwriting into 
v 
typescript. Her diligent and careful effort in the prepara--
tion of the thesis from rough draft into final form entailed 
details known only to and appreciated by those who travel 
the final steps towards a terminal degree. 
To my parents, whose early sacrifices and continued 
faith and generosity have made this possible, I acknowledge 
the debt of a son. 
To my father-in-law, Dr. A. E. Darlow, former Vice-
President for Agricultural Sciences and Dean of Agriculture, 
Oklahoma State University, his advice, guidance and generos-
ity in many ways will always be deeply appreciated. 
My last, but certainly not least, acknowledgment of debt 
goes to my dear heart, my wife, without whose encouragement 
and love this task could never have been accomplished. To 
her and our three sons, who in their young years sometimes 
wonder what life is worth if even old men still have to go 
to school, I hope to make it seem worthwhile. 
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The essential executive functions in an organization 
are to (a) provide a system of communication, (b) to pro-
mote the securing of essential effort, and (c) to formulate 
and define purpose. While the first and third of these 
functions have been widely analyzed and revised, less has 
I 
been recorded on the securing and maintaining of essential 
effort in the organization. 
In a sense, the emphasis now appears to be the view 
that the efficiency of the organization is measured by its 
capacity to offer effective inducements in sufficie~t quan-
tity to maintain the equilibrium of the cooperative system. 
Barnard (1, p. 93) indicates that it is efficiency in this 
sense and not the efficiency of material productiveness which 
maintains the vitality of the organization . In this context, 
the meaning of efficiency as applie~ to organization is the 
maintenance of an equilibrium of 9rganizational activities 
through the satisfaction of the motives of individual con-
tributors sufficient to produce such activities. 
The appraisal of organization activity does not lend 
itself to isolated measurements. It is an appraisal of the 
whole system, the system of cooperative effort. 
1 
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Cooperation is an expression of human will and purpose 
in a physical environment. It is never a creator of, and, to 
no degree, an operator on physical material. It is a crea-
tor and convertor of utility - a satisfying preference 
function. However, most possible cooperation is not under-
taken or is not successful. To be successful, cooperation 
must create utility, and it must not be so allocated in the 
process of cooperative activity that no surplus remains to 
satisfy human motives. Barnard (2, p. 253) credits the sys-
tem as: 
Each incoming contribution goes into a pool, as it 
were, and each outgoing distribution goes out of 
the pool, but the two cannot be identified. They 
cannot be identified because it is utilities, not 
the things to which utilities are ascribed, which 
are paid in and paid out; and utilities are created 
in the process. That is the reason for cooperation. 
This means that efficiency of organization results from 
two controls: the control of output and income at the point 
of exchange, at the periphery of the organization 9 and co-
ordination which is internal and the productive factor in 
the organization. Exchange is the distribution of utility; 
coordination is the creator of utility. 
For the organization to survive, coordination must it-
self create a surplus of utilities. The necess i ty for con-
servatism in the distribution arises from the probability 
that the surplus, small perhaps in most successful organiza-
tions, will not be sufficient to permit dissipation by 
waste, and the organization wil l otherwise fail. 
The equilibrium of the organization economy requires 
that it shall command and exchange sufficient utilities of 
various kinds so that it is able in turn to command and 
exchange services of which it is constituted. It does this 
by securing through the application of these services the 
appropriate supplies of utilities which,when distributed to 
the contributors, insure the continuance of appropriate 
contributions of utilities from them. Inasmuch as each of 
these contributors requires .a surplus in his exchange; that 
is, a net inducement, the organization can survive only as 
it secures by exchange and creation a surplus of utilities 
in its own economy. 
The nature of this economy must be strongly emphasized 
because fixed notions in current use so often conceal it. 
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For example, it is said that a commercial organization can-
not survive unless its income exceeds its outgo; a statement 
that begs the point. It is only true if no one will con-
tribute the deficit in commercial goods for non-commercial 
reasons. But, this does not infrequently occur. Family 
pride, philanthropic motives, and national prestige often 
induce economic contributions for non-commercial motives 
that enable an organization that is economic in character to 
survive. And the fact is plain that organizations in large 
numbers that are unsuccessful economically nevertheless con-
tinue to exist, whatever may be the motives. They can exist, 
however, if the economic and other satisfactions which they 
produce or secure as a whole can pay for the economic and 
other services which they consume as a whole. 
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The appraisal of an organization is not a personal 
appraisal, nor, except incidentally, a market appraisal, nor 
the resultant of individual appraisals. The appraisal is 
and must be an appraisal based on its coordinative action-
something unique to itself. The organization appraises 
physical possessions, social relations, personal contribu-
tions, on the basis of what it can do with them. The organ-
ization can create some utilities for itself by its action; 
it can gain some utilities by exchanges; it can transmute or 
transfer utilities. The ability of the organization to act 
and to survive depends upon the success of its action in 
maintaining the pool of utilities it can use. 
CHAPTER II 
ORGANIZATION THEORY AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
The assumption of economic rationality in the theory of 
the firm wherein scarce resources are allocated by the price 
mechanism is supported by two propositions: (a) firms op-
erate with perfect knowledge, and (b) firms seek to maximize 
profits. A number of attempts have been made to adapt these 
propositions to higher levels of soph_istication. First, it 
can be assumed that firms maximize the discounted value of 
future positive funds flow, and, secondly, that firms have 
perfect knowledge only up to a probability distribution of 
all future states of the environment. 
There have been two basic challenges to the profit max-
imization criterion presumedly used by managers . Firstj is 
profit the only objective of the firm? Second, does maximi-
zation describe what the firms do about profits? Papandreau 
(3, pp. 183-219) argues that organizational objectives grow 
out of interaction among the various participants in the 
organization. This interaction produces a general "prefer-
ence function," but Papandreau leaves little analytical 
thought beyond the profit maximization function he 
criticizes. An alternative to the preference function is 
5 
6 
suggested by Rothschild (4, pp. 297-320) who suggests that 
the primary motive of the manager is long run survival. In 
this view, decisions aim to maximize the security level of 
the organization. The security level implies that the prob-
ability of survival over the long run is maximized. Baumol 
(5, pp. 45-53) offers the suggestion, derived from empirical 
studies, that a security level of profit is maintained only 
as a constraint on sales maximization. Again, the analysis 
Baumol derives has the implication of long run survival as 
the firm seeks contributors to the organization who may be 
not only direct employees, but commercial funding firms to 
whom the firm looks for outside capital requirements. 
The second attack on the assumption of profit maximiza-
tion recognizes the importance of profits, but questions the 
assumption of maximization of profit. Gordon (6, p. 265), 
Simon (7,. p. 99), and Margolis (8, p. 187) have all argued 
that profit maximizing should be replaced with a goal of 
making satisfactory profits. Satisfactory profits represent 
a level of aspiration - a security level - that is used as 
an evaluator of alternative policy and action. The aspira-
tion or security level may change over time, but in the 
• 
short run it defines a dichotomous'utility function through 
which alternatives are good enough or not good enough. This 
critique of maximization of profit is linked with other pro-
posals for revision of organization goals. Primary among 
these proposals is that of Simon who suggests that informa-
tion is not given to the firm, but must be obtained; that 
alternatives are searched for and discovered sequentially, 
and that the order in which the environment is searched de-
termines to a substantial extent the decisions that will be 
made. In this way, the theory of choice and the theory of 
search become closely entwined, thus take on prime impor-
tance in the general theory of decision-making. 
Conflicts in Goal Measurement 
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A more conventional attempt to deal with the same prob-
lem is reflected in recent contributions to a normative 
theory of search proposed by Charnes and Cooper (9, pp. 450-
458). In this theory, search activity is one of the compet-
itors for internal resources, and expenditures for search 
are made up to the point where the marginal cost of search 
equals the marginal expected return from it. These elabora-
tions of the the ory are clearly more traditional than Simon 
(7) proposes, but they do not meet the requirement of satis-
fying the complaint. Unfortunately, the theory in all its 
standard forms ignores the situation that decisions are made 
in organizations. There is one relevant exception to the 
void. Marshall (10), as others before him, was impressed by 
the apparent increasing returns to scale. Marshall under-
took to explain the historical reduction in production costs 
by introducing the concepts of internal and external econo-
mies, and it is this germ of an idea about the effect of or-
ganizational size on organizational performance, by the use 
of "internal economies," that became important to several 
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decades of theory development (10)~ This development ignored 
other important organizational aspects of the firm. 
In recent years there has been speculation about the 
effects of other organizational factors. First, the failure 
to view the firm as an organization has been criticized. 
Papandreau (3) has made perhaps the most detailed argument 
for expanding the framework of the firm. He views the firm 
as a cooperative system. The executive tasks are accom-
plished by a "peak coordinator." The firm has certain goals, 
and it is the peak coordinator's job to achieve these by 
allocating resources rationally. This involves three 
actions: (a) substantive planning - constructing the 
firm's budget, (b) procedural planning - constructing a 
system of communication and authority, and (c) executing 
both plans. 
Within such a model of the firm, Papandreau sees cer-
tain areas of psychology playing a helpful role. The goals 
of the firm are strongly influenced by both internal and 
external forces. The internal influences come from such 
entities as stockholders, unions, government, and so forth. 
The preference function, previously mentioned, is a result-
ant of the influences which are exerted upon the firm. The 
peak coordinator's job is to maximize the preference func-
tion. The greatest difficulty with Papandreau's analysis is 
that it does not relate specifically to decision-making. It 
provides a general analysis of the firm from the standpoint 
of organization theory without specifying precisely how the 
model can be used for economically-oriented decisions. 
The second indictment against current organization 
theory alleges that firms, in fact, do not equate marginal 
cost and marginal revenue in deciding on either output or 
price, rather they follow one or another of a series of 
rules of thumb in allocating resources. The cause for con-
cern, although, appears to be more a lack of integrating 
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tools of resource allocation due to substantial differences 
that have been found in decision-making processes. Many 
decision-making processes cannot offer proof acceptance of 
the theory of the firm since application capability is not 
wholly present in the decision environment. Many of the 
attacks on the theory of the firm are not so much proper 
critiques of existing theory as they are suggestions for the 
development of a theory appropriate with regard to the inter-
nal allocation of resources. 
The objective to merge economic theory, i.e., the theory 
of the firm, with organization theory rests upon the inte-
gration of these theories through the particular attributes 
of utility theory. 
To assess if such integration is possible, it is pos-
sible to examine three major divisions of interest in organ-
ization theory. 
The first of these, the sociological division, was 
founded on the precepts of Weber, Durkeim, Pareto, and 
Michels and centers on the phenomena of bureaucracy. The 
second division is social psychology and has been built 
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primarily on an experimental base with an emphasis on an 
"efficiency" criterion. The third is administrative in the 
sense that it focuses on the problems of the executive in 
dealing with an organization. 
The early sociological theories of Weber and Durheim 
(11) emphasized the division of labor and specialization as 
broa.d .. social trends and the,, importance of organization 
i·,;' 
growth in utilizing specialized competences. Weber placed 
considerable emphasis on the rationality or adaptable be-
havior of bureaucratic organization. To a certain extent, 
the early theorists and, to a much greater extent, modern 
sociological studies of organizations emphasized what Merton 
.. .. '..... ... ., ' ' ... 
( 1:2): has labeled:' the. "unanticipated· consequences of.pur.ppsiire 
social action!",: The major variables tend to be such things 
as subgoal differentiation and conflict, individual person-
ality changes, and the organization ·life-cycle. 
Social psychological approaches to organizational 
phe¥o_mena h:a:ve tended. to be less expanE1ive in sc_ol)e. In 
general, they have taken.a relatively obyious criterion of 
efficiency, for example, productivity, in a simple task and 
examined experimentally the effect of some small set of in-
dependent variables in the efficiency of the organization. 
In this tradition have· been the studies of communica-
tion nets, simulated radar warning stations, and small prob-
lem solving groups. Somewhat less experimental have been 
the studies of morale and productivity, which also emphasize 
explicitly a cri terio·n of efficiency ( 13) ( 14). 
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The final branch of organization theory dates, in a 
sense, from the earliest political and social philosophers. 
Speculation about centralization and decentralization and 
the problems of coordination. can be found in pre-Christian 
writings. However, modern administrative theorists gener-
ally reject the earlier formulations with considerable 
vigor. 
In particular, Barnard (2) and Simon (15) have argued 
against the excessively formal and nonoperational analyses 
I 
of ei,,rly administrative theory. 
Much of the recent work in this branch of organization 
theory takes the decision-making process as its specific 
focus of concern. The theory tends to present a dichotomy; 
each dealing with a certain class of decisions of signifi-
cance to organizations. The first stem views the organiza-
tion as a system of contributors through which transfer 
payments are arranged among the contributors. The theory 
describes the decision to contribute and specifies the con-
ditions of organizational survival in terms of maintaining 
an equilibrium of contributions from and payments to the 
contributors. 
The second stem views the development of theory 
explaining how decisions are made in organizations with par-
ticular emphasis upon the region of executive influence and 
the impact of organizational position on individual goals 
and perceptions. 
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The Present Level of Combined Theory 
'Without attempting to describe the various forms that 
theoretical arguments have assumed within organization 
theory, three main points emphasize the present state of the 
disassociation of organization theory and economic theory. 
1. Orga~ization theory focuses on a set of prob-
lems that are different from those of the 
economic theory of the firm. Its problems are 
not specifically economic; virtually nothing 
is said about out~ut levels, economies of 
scale, and budget determination. 
2. Although it places considerable emphasis on 
the study of "process" - the study of what 
goes on in an organization - only the third 
branch of the theory focuses primarily upon 
· organizational decision making processes. 
3. Unlike the theory of the firm, there is little 
consideration of aggregation of resources. 
There is little reference of a commodity to 
aggregate. 
As a consequence, existing organization theory provides 
little quantitative basis for merging economic theory into a 
modified theory of the firm. The sociological and social 
psychological approaches have emphasized questions that are 
only marginally relevant to either the objectives of conven-
tional theories of the firm or the objective of predicting 
13 
individual firm behavior. The decision-making approach has 
developed a substantial theory of decision-making processes 
in an organizational context, but has not applied the theory 
to the specific environmental conditions in which th~ busi-
ness firm operates nor applied the theory in detail to the 
particular decision variables that characterize the firm's 
operations. 
As a modification of Cyert and March's ( 16), "organiza-
tional slack"n. notion, the ability of the. organization to 
) 
survive, i.e., to obtain goals, represents its ability to 
implement an effective control system to essentially allo-
cate resources in some· predictive fashion to assure ob-
taining effort by necessary contributors. 
As defined by Cyert and March (16, p. 34): 
· Organizational slack represents the disparity 
between the resources available in the organ-
ization and the payments required to maintain· 
coalition of members contributing to the firm. 
This difference between total resources and 
total necessary payments is what we call organ-
izational slack. 
While Cyert and March have reached a fairly refined level in 
their theory, their construct yields to sub-optimal charac-
teristics of goal attainment, i.e., a production goal, 
inventory goal, profit goal,and market share goal. The 
optimal construct appears to be capable of synthesizing the 
subgoals into a utility function to represent the total 
resources of the firm and the demands placed on these re-
sources by contributors. 
CHAPTER III 
UTILITY THEORY 
To .develop a theory of organization survival, some 
notions of utility must be presentedo 
The measurement of utility was considered possible by 
the Nineteenth Century economists Jevons, Walras, and 
Marshall (17). They argued that utility - the satisfaction 
derived from possession and/or consumption of commodities -
was measurable in the same sense that the weight of objects 
is measurable o .Marshall and Walras were the strongest pro-
p6nents of measurable (cardinal) utility, and, although 
they were never satisfactorily able to quantify their 
theory, much of their work was accepted from the notion of 
maximizing total utility of commodities by way of the law 
of diminishing marginal utility. The conclusion was that 
the marginal utility of a commodity would be proportional 
to the exchange price. Marshall implied that the utility 
function was known. Unfortunately, it could never be devel-
oped satisfactorily. It remained for Walras to discover 
ordinal utility measurement. Walras determined that, given 
a indifference map of utility, no cardinal measurements 
would be required to establish the marginal rate of 
14 
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substitution of factors. The discovery that no scaling of 
utility preferences were required for establishing factor 
demand remained the chief source of utility doctrine until 
the now-classic Von Neumann-Morgenstern discovery of cardinal 
measurement in 1944. Pareto (17) refined Walras' ordinal theory 
and established ordinal utility theory in the manner of 
Figure 1. Pareto maintained that all consumer behavior can 
be described in terms of preferences, or rankings, in which a 
consumer need only state which of two collections of goods 
or activities he prefers without reporting on the magnitude 
of any numerical index of the strength of this preference. 
Indifference Curves 
The analytical device developed to represent ordinal 
preference is the indifference map developed from Figure 1 
and illustrated as Figure 2. In this latter diagram, quan-
tities of different commodities (goods or activities) are 
measured along the axes so that point 1 on difference curve 
AA' represents a collection of commodities consisting of one 
unit of wages and four units of other job emoluments. It 
represents no more than this, and this datum by itself con-
tains no informc;3.tion about the consumer of utility. In par-
ticular, it does not mean that he is indifferent between 
four emolument units and one wage unit. Every possible com-
bination of these two factors can be represented by a point 
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curve is the locus of points each of which represents a col-
lection of factors such that the consumer of utility is in-
different among any of these combinationso As an example, 
point 2 in Figure 2, means that the utility-consumer is in-
different between collections of factors represented by 
points 1 and 2. Each discrete combination of factors rep-
resented on curve AA' represents a fixed level of utility 
demand. 
If it is assumed that the consumer prefers combinations 
represented by points on higher indifference curves, e.g., 
he prefers factor combination 3> 1, the indifference map 
provides a complete and simple report on the utility con-
sumer's ordering of all possible combinations of the two 
factors. For if two combinations are represented by points 
on the same indifference curve, the utility consumer is in-
different between them, and, in any other case, he prefers 
that collection which is represented by a point on a higher 
indifference curve. 
Exchange Criteria 
Since all combinations of consumption factors repre-
sented by points on an indifference curve,,AA' have equal 
utility, the utility consumer's indifference curves are the 
contour lines or iso-utili ty lines of his utility preferences. 
The important characteristics of indifference mapping 
now come to light. 
The slope of an indifference curve has a significant 
interpretation. 1-4 In Figure 2, arc 1-2 has the slope 2 _ 4 . 
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In moving from point 1 to point 2, the utility consumer 
loses 1 - 4 ( or 2) emolument uni ts and gains 1 - 2 ( or 1) wage 
2 unit. Thus, the absolute value of the slope is 1 = 2, which 
indicates the utility loss of 2 emolument units can be re-
placed by a gain of 1 wage unit. 
This absolute value of the slope, called the marginal 
rate of substitution (MRS), therefore, represents the number 
of units of the latter whose loss can be made up by a unit 
gain in the former. It is the consumer's psychological rate 
of exchange between two factors. 
It is also possible to show that this slope is equal 
(in absolute units) to the fraction marginal utility of 
emoluments/marginal utility of wages; that is, 
slope AA' = MRS = !::,, Emoluments 
!::,, Wages 
MU of Wages 
= MU of Emoluments$ 
This inverse relationship between t::,,E and the marginal util-
ity of E represents that t::,,E = 2 units of Wages which a util-
ity consumer is willing to give up for t::,,W = 1 unit of Wages. 
An important distinction to recognize in indifference 
mapping is that while MU appears in the analysis, only the 
ratio of two marginal utilities ever occurs in indifference 
analysis. In such a ratio, the marginal utility of one 
commodity is not measured in utiles, but in terms of the 
other commodity. The question in ordinal utility theory is 
how much of E an additional unit of· W is worth or what is the 
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Indifference curve analysis requires that certain as-
sumptions be made concerning the choice behavior of utility 
consumers: 
1. Nonsatiety: The consumer is not oversupplied 
with either factor; he prefers more emoluments 
and/or wages. 
2. Transitivity: If A, B, and Dare any three 
factor combinations, then if A~ Band B ~ D, 
then A::J D. This condition simply requires 
that the utility consumer possesses a concep-
tually simple type of consistency of preferences. 
3. Diminishing Marginal Rate of Substitution: 
Consider two points, 1 and 2, in Figure 2. If 
at point 2, the consUiner has a relatively small 
amount of W compared with a large supply of E, 
then at 2 the marginal utility of the relatively 
scarcer W will be large in comparison to that of 
E, i.e., the consumer will be willing to give up 
only a relatively small amount of Win exchange 
for an additional unit of E. 
With these three assumptions, certain :properties of indif- -· 
ference curves develop: 
1. An indifference curve which lies above and to the 
right of another indifference curve represents 
preferred combinations of factors. 
2. Indifference curves have a negative slope. 
3. Indifference curves can never meet or cross. 
4. The absolute slope of the indifference curve 
diminishes toward the right. 
Prediction of Utility Consumption 
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The interesting capabilities of ordinal utility theory 
now permit extensions of current theory to predict economic 
behavior of a manager in dispensing utility to contributors 
of an organization. 
Since the axes of an indifference map represent only 
quantities of factors rather than real amounts of money, a 
resource budget or constraint line will permit an analysis 
of the quantity of utility limited resources may provide. 
For example, Figure 3 (page 17) presents an indiffer-
ence map together with a budget restraint line AA', which 
represents the various combinations of factors which may be 
purchased to equal the budget restraint. 
If the price of factors is fixed, that is,they do not 
vary with the amount of goods purchased, the budget re-
straint line will possess the following properties: 
1. It will be a straight line. 
2. It will have a negative slope equal to the 
inverse ratio of 




of the two fac-
3. The amount of budget restraint, R, is repre-
sented by the following equation where: 
E = quantity of emoluments 
W = quantity of wages 
then 
PE= unit price of E 
Pw = unit price of W 
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For the case where quantity discounts may be applied as 
a function of the learning progress function, the budget re-
straint line will be convex to the origin. 
The point of equilibrium will occur at point T, Figure 
4, at the point of tangency where the slope of the budget 
restraint line and that of the indifference curve are equal. 
Pw MUy . 
Thus, equilibrium occurs when!)= MU = MRSWE. 
E . E . 
Growth and Decay of Factor Utility 
Two important concepts are now developed to reveal the 
impact of changes in budget restraints and changes in the 
prices of factors as viewed by the executive in distributing 
utility to the individual contributors of the organization. 
The budget restraint effect indicates that the growth 
or decay of budget resources definitely increases the util-
ity mix of factors available for distribution to contribu-
tors. The primary change to be noted is a change i'.n absolute 









Figure 5. Price Change Shift 
the budget restraint line as sb.own: in Figure 4. The shift 
of factor combinations as budget restraint changes is de-
picted by the expansion path of factor combinations as 
budget resources change. 
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At this point, we have assumed factor prices have re-
mained constant. If this assumption is relaxed, recognition 
of changes in the system of utility mix can be identified 
from both the change in budget restraint as well as from a 
change in factor price. Conventionally known as the Slutsky 
Theorem, the change in utility mix will first be examined 
for a price change with budget restraint fixed. If the 
price of job emolumen~s declines .and the price of wages re-
mains constant, then the manager can obtain more distributable 
utility in the form of job emoluments than before prices 
changed. Given a series of consecutive price changes, the 
change in the system of utility mix appears as in Figure 5. 
If Figure 4 and 5 are each viewed independently, there 
are certain characteristics each analysis displays which is 
of interest in the distribution of utility. 
In Figure 4, the expansion path is identified as the 
locus of points tangent to budget restraint lines·and the 
iso-utility lines. The expansion path indicates how the 
relative proportion of the utility factors changes as greater 
amounts of utility are.required by the organization if the 
optimal cost of incentives is to be maintained. The expan-
sion path is shown to have a concave to origin slope to in-
dicate as greater utility demands are made, the mix 
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proportion shows that as utility demand increases,the rate 
of demand increase for job emoluments is greater than for 
wages. Wages become an "inferior" factor for as utility 
demand increases, more job emoluments are substituted for 
given wage increases. The reverse conclusion can easily be 
shown to indicate that organization activity can generate 
an inferior demand for job emoluments. 
In Figure 5 (page 23), the expansion path is initiated 
at point A~ rather than at origin, since as the price of job 
emoluments increases, the manager feels he can get less and 
less of this factor for a given budget restraint. Eventu-
ally, when the price of job emoluments goes high enough, the 
manager will be forced to discontinue its distribution 
entirely and the utility mix will consist of only one fac-
tor, wageso 
If the effects of budget restraint changes and price 
changes are combined, then the effect of substitution of 
factors and the expansion effect of budget resources can 
both be identified to be equally applicable to (a) those 
organizations which have unlimited capital, and to (b) those 
organizations which have limited capital and must consume 
the utility of contributors only up to a given limit of 
available resources. Both types of situations are illus-
trated in Figure 6. With factor-price ratios as indicated 
by the slope of the iso-cost line and the utility demand in-
dicated by the iso-utility curve, U3 , the optimal cost com-






Figure 6. Substitution and Expansion Effects 
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Figure 7. Input Relationships 
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If the price of factor W falls relative to the price of fac-
tor E as indicated by a new iso-cost line 2, an input of OE1 
units of E and OW2 units of W will optimize costs for au, 
level of utility. A substitution effect has taken place: 
input of W has increased by W1 W2 units while input of E has 
decreased by E3 E1 units. The substitution effect, use of 
more Wand less E for the same output of product, results 
from changes in the relative prices of the factors. The 
expansion effect is demonstrated after a fall in the price 
of factor W, acquisition of additional utility can be accom-
plished because of either or both of the following: (a) the 
same cost outlay will allow the organization with limited 
resources to hire more f~ctors, and (b) the lower cost ratio 
(due to a decrease in price of Wand a substitution of this 
factor for E), allows utility acquisition to be extended to 
a higher iso-utility curve before the marginal cost of fac-
tor resources exceeds the value of their marginal utility 
for an organization with unlimited capital. The expansion 
effect is illustrated where utility acquisition is increased 
to U2 after price changes and OE2 units of E and ow, units 
of Ware used. In respect to factor W, the substitution 
effect resulted in an increase in its use by W1 W2 units. 
In respect to factor E, the expansion effect resulted in use 
of another W2 W3 units. In respect to factor E, the expan-
sion effect partially offset the substitution effect; while 
the substitution effect reduced the use of Eby E1 E3 units, 
the expansion effect restores E1 E2 units to use. 
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Economic Complements and Substitutes 
It is not impossible for the expansion effect to result 
in increased use of both factors. If in Figure 6 (page 26), 
the expansion effect is so great that it requires a utility 
level of U1 , use of E will increase to OE4 , while the input 
of W will increase to OW4 • This combination includes more 
of both factors than the original quantities OE3 and OW1 • 
Factors E and W have now become economic complements. When 
two factors, E and W, can be used in acg_uiring utility and a 
decrease in the price of factor W leads to an increase in 
acquired utility and an increase in use of both factors E 
and W, the factors are economic complements. If more of 
factor Wis used while less of factor Eis used, with util-
ity acquisition remaining the same or increasing, the two 
factors are economic substitutes. 
Rational Choice in Factor Mix 
Iso-utility curves for complementary, substitute, and 
limitational input factors are analyzed for a single iso-
utility curve, U1 , Figure 7 (page 26). Input of E serves as 
a complementary and limi tational fac'tor· relative to W. 
After reaching OW1 units of W input, no amount of substitu-
tion of W for E will reduce the input level of E below OE1 
units. Down to this level of OE1 , E serves as a substitute 
for W. E serves as a complement for W beyond level OW1, 
since no amount of substitution of W for E will permit 
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utility to be increased to a higher Ux level. To apply com-
binations of factors in the region to the left of Ridge Line 
I requires that the quantity of W applied to generate a Ux 
level of utility is greater than required, or clearly a mis-
appropriation of resources. 
To·display the usefulness of isoquant theory, it.is 
deemed practical to present a theory of utility production 
in both theoretical and demonstration form in Chapter V •. 
Ordinal Utility Theory 
The theoretical application of ordinal utility theory 
seems faultless. The difficulty, obviously, is that while 
ordinal theory lends itself to optimal decision patterns, 
the quantification of utility preferences is quite difficult 
under ordinal theory. In fact, the premise of ordinal 
theory lies in only an ordering of preferences. In a non-
deterministic environment, the evaluation of ordinal.alter-
nate op~~rtunities is outstandingly weak. 
The essential development by Von Ne.umann and Morgenstern 
(18) in 1944 to allow for the quantification of utility 
preferences allowed for the refined techniques that are de-
veloped as tools of decision-making. As a consequence of 
the quantitative measurement of utility, the strength of 
both ordinal and cardinal utility theory will be presented 
in combined form. 
In utilizing both cardinal and ordinal utility concepts, 
the objective is to allow for the probabilistic distribution 
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of alternative outcomes in the decision environment of the 
manager as he seeks to maintain the stability of the 
organization. 
The traditional mathematical device for dealing with 
risk and uncertainty has been to accept an available alter-
native so as to maximize expected value. The expected value 
of an alternative is found by multiplying the value of each 
possible outcome of alternative by its probability of 
occurrence and summing· these products for all possible out-
comes: In symbols, then 
Expected Value = Pi $1 + P2 $2 + • • • + P n $n 
where Pm represents the probability of occurrence and $n 
represents the dollar value of the.nth possible outcome from 
a chosen alternative. Based upon this method of choosing 
among activities representing financial return, Daniel 
Bernoulli (19) discovered that the expected value criterion 
appears as a questionable test of acceptability when con-
fronted with his St. Petersburg paradox. 
The paradox is described as follows: A persons buys a 
chance to flip a coin until a head appears a Should heads ap-
pear on the first throw, he receives one dollar. Should 
nd th heads appear on the 2 , 3rd, ••• , n throw, he receives 
two dollars, four dollars .•• , $2n-l, respectively. How 
much should he rationally pay for a chance to play the 
game? 
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The Sto Petersburg game's -expected value, assuming the 
'• 
coin to be fair, can be computed as follows: 
EV 
One would expect a rational, expected return maximizing 
risk taker, therefore, to pay virtually anything for a 
chance at it. Why, asked Bernoulli, are takers so scarce at 
twenty dollars a throw? 
A number of answers are pcissible~ One is that an infi..;. 
ni te s·eries of tails would break the banko The meaningful 
value of the· game under this twenty dollar constraint then 
is: 
20 
Ev = -12, .(1-)t-l 1 L,,, = 2(19) = $9.50. 
t:::::l 
Another viewpoint is that the probability of' a long:.·: :: 
seri:es is close to zero. ·._ The: probability of; a long run.,of .. 
successive tails is: 
P20 = (12)20 = -33 .9537 x 10 
Yet, another factor lies in the assumed proportionality be-
tween money and satisfaction. Bernoulli favors this last. " 
reason. He contends that $20 .,OG 1·s not equal, but is less 
than 20 times as valuable as one dollar. 
The paradox lies in the expected return criterion's 
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symmetrical treatment of extreme poss~ble outcomes. 
Another extreme, however, is of more specific concern 
to the manager -- the possibility of a serious financial 
reverse o Is a loss of $20 ,000 exactly twice as unpleasant as 
a loss of one-half that amount. What is the value of the 
last dollar that stands between success and failure of the 
organization. 
Symmetrical treatment of the value of one's first and 
last unit of money wealth by the expected return criterion 
can defend an insurance company's sale of a policy (on 
which it has a positive expected return) to a policy holder 
as being a rational act; but, it cannot provide the same 
justification for the policy's buyer. Indeed, it can always 
justify one who offers (but never one who takes) an unfair 
bet. Thus, neither the person who refuses to stake his for-
tune on a try at the St. Petersburg game, nor the one who 
accepts an unfair bet from an insurance company can be clas-
sified, by this criterion, as a rational investor. 
The Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Index 
Since Bernoulli first proposed a cardinal utility value 
for money, later to be suppressed by Pareto (17), individual 
utility values are taken into consideration implicitly in 
every decision that an individual makes. Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern merely proposed a method for extracting and re-
cording these values so that they can be explicitly used as 
a guide to action -- and what is particularly important, as 
a guide to consistent action. With utility values explic-
itly stated, alternatives can be viewed in the light of 
generating proper levels of utility. 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (l~) pointed out that the 
usual assumption that economic man can always say whether 
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he prefers one state to another or is indifferent between 
them needs only to be slightly modified in order to imply 
cardinal utility. The modification consists of adding that 
economic man can also completely order probability combina-
tions of stateso Thus, suppose that an economic man is in-
different between the certain possession of $15.00 and a 50-
50 chance of gaining $20.00 or nothing. It can be assumed 
that his indifference between these two choices means that 
they have the same utility for him. By defining the utility 
of $0.00 as zero utiles and the utility of $20.00 as 20 
utiles, two arbitrary definitions, defining the two unde-
fined constants which are permissible since cardinal utility 
is measured only up to a linear transformation, are avail-
able. The utility of $15.00 may be calculated by using the 
concept of expected utility as follows: 
U($15.oo) = o.5U($20.00) + o.5U($O.OO) 
U($15.00) = 0.5(20) + 0.5(0) 
U($15.oo) = 10 utiles 
where: U(X) represents the utility of X dollars. 
Stated symbolically: 
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U(B) = P a[U(A)J + (1- P a)[U(C)] 
where 
U(A) = utility of A 
U(B) = utility of B 
U(C) = utility of c 
Pa = Probability of A being received 
(1- pa) = Probability of B being received. 
The Formal Proof of Cardinal Utility Measurement 
The formal proof of the Von N.eumann-Morgenstern cardinal 
utility index rests on five assumptions: 
Assumption 1. Transitivity: If an individual is 
indifferent between two alternatives, A and 
B, and he is also indifferent between Band C, 
then he will be indifferent between A and C. 
Assumption 2. Continuity of Preferences: This is 
the assumption that if an alternative, A, is 
preferred to another alternative, B, when P(A) = 
1, and if Bis preferred to A when P(A) = O, 
then there exists some value of P(A) whereby the 
decision-maker is indifferent between his choice 
for A and B. 
Assumption 3. Independence: If four alternatives 
exist, A, B, C, and D, and if the decision 
maker is indifferent between alternative A and B, 
and he is also indifferent between alternatives 
C and D, and if A I B represents an indifferent 
choice between A and B, then (A,C)I(B,D). For 
any probability P, then P(A,C)I P(B,D). 
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Assumption 4. Desire for High Probability of Success: 
For any alternativesAIB, if Pa> Pb to represent 
the probability of obtaining A is greater than 
the probability of attaining B, then A is 
preferred to B when Pa(A) > Pb(B). 
Assumption 5. Com.pound Probabilities: For any alter-
natives A and B, where A is preferred to B, and 
any probability numbers P1 , P2 , P3 , P<i. , then in the 
classical notation of a lottery ticket array 
devised by Von Neumann-Morgenstern' (;te): 
P1[P2 (A,B), P3 (A,B)J I [P4 (A,B)J 
where if a lottery ticket holder wins not a prize, 
but another lottery ticket [P2 (A,B)J which contains 
a high probability of A being won. If the player 
loses, then he receives a consolation lottery 
,,. .. 
ticket offering the same (A,B), but with a low 
probability of winning A (and, consequently, a 
high probability of winning B). Then, what is 
the probability of eventually winning the superior 
prize A? There is a probability P1 of winning the 
better lottery ticket which offers A with prob-
ability P2 , so the probability of getting E in 
this manner is (P1 )(P2 ). However, if he loses, 
which has a :probability of (1 - P1 ), the ticket 
holder still has the :probability, P3 , of getting 
.A, so that there is a :probability (l-P1 )(P3 ) of 
obtaining A. The total :probability of obtaining 
A is then f\P2 + (l-P1 )(P3 ), which is P4 • 
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The interpretation of this last assumption is to say 
that an individual's :psychology is such that he will evalu-
ate a compound lottery ticket (or a compound decision event) 
in terms of the probabilities of winning the utlimate prize 
(or objective). 
Some Theorems of Applications 
In a traditional demonstration, a lottery ticket is now 
chosen to be used as a standard against which other alterna-
tives can be evaluated. The ticket is assumed to offer to 
the winner the prize E, eternal bliss; to the loser, D, 
damnation, so that any alternative, A, which is brought to 
be evaluated against this standard ticket will be :presumedly 
no better than E and no worse than D. 
By Assumption 2, for any such A, there will be a :prob-
ability number P1 (0 < P1 < 1) such that AI[P a (E ,D)]. The 
following is proof: 
Theorem 1. Poesibility of Predicting: Given any two 
lottery tickets P(A,B) and P'(A',B') and a person whose 
preferences never violate Assumption 1-5, if there is ob-
tained (say by his introspection) the four :probabilities, 
numbers Pa, Pa', Pb, Pb' so chosen that: 
AI[Pa(E,D)] and BI[Pb(E,D)], etc., 
then from these probabilities it is possible to predict 
which of the two lottery tickets will be preferred. 
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(1) 
Proof: The first lottery ticket is evaluated in terms 
of E and D. This is done by replacing A and B by their 
equivalents in terms of the standard lottery ticket to 
obtain 
[P(A,B)] I [Pa(E,D)], [Pb(E,D)] by Assumption 3 (2) 
0 
•• [P(A,B)] I [P4(E,D)J by Assumption 1 and 5 (3) 
where P4 is the p:robabili ty PP a+ ( 1 - P)Pb. Similarly, the 
second lottery ticket can be evaluated in terms of E and D 
as: 
[P'(A,B)J I [P4 ' (E,D)J where P/ = P'P;_, + (1-P')Pb,. (4) 
Therefore, by Assumption 4, the in~ividual must prefer 
[P(A,B)] to P'(A', B') if and only if 
and indifference between these tickets exists if and only if 
P4 = P4 'o But, by hypothesis, P, P' are numbers given by the 
terms of the two lottery tickets, and Pa' Pb, P;_, and Pb' 
were found out by observing or questioning the lottery ticket 
holder. Then, P4 and P4 ' can be evaluated directly and the 
higher of these two numbers must, by Assumption 4, corre-
spond to the preferred lottery ticket. 
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Now, the construction of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
index is completed and used to predict correctly the choice 
of lottery ticket. As previously indicsted, the following 
linguistic convention is used for evaluating the utility of 
a lottery ticket in terms of the utilities of its prizes: 
U [ P ( A , B )] = PU (A) + ( 1 - P) U ( B) . 
That.is, if P = three-fourths, so that the odds of 
winning are 3 to 1, the utility of the lottery ticket is 
evaluated at three-fourths the utility of a win plus one-
fourth the utility of a defeat. But this only represents a 
convention. To show that it is usable, one must first re-
state, in terms of the present notation, how these utility 
numbers can be found, and then one must prove that they must 
always assign a higher utility number to the preferred 
lottery ticket. 
To find the utility of any alternative, A, one first 
assigns arbitrary "utility 10 numbers: 
U(E) > U(D) (6) 
to eternal bliss (E) and damnation (D) in our standard 
lottery ticket. Now, U(A) by reference to Equation (1) is 
found and defined: 
U(A) = U[Pa(E,D), U(B) = U[Pb(E,D], etc., (7) 
so that by Equation (6): 
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U(A) = PaU(E) + (1-Pa)U(D), etc. (8) 
Hence, by finding Pa in Equation (1), the utility num-
ber U(A) can be computed. 
Finally, it can be proven: 
Theorem II. Validi1z._Qf the Prediction: These utility 
numbers rank lottery tickets correctly so that U[P(A,B)J > 
U[P'(A', B'J if and only if the former is the preferred lot-
tery ticket; i.e., if and only if Equation (5) holds. 
Proof: The utility of the first lottery ticket is: 
U[P(A,B)] = PU(A) + (1 - P) U (B) by Equation (6) (9) 
= PU[Pa(E,D) + (1 - P)U[Pb(E,D)J by 
Equations: .(1) .and (?) (10) 
+ (1 - P)[PbU(E) 
+ (1 - Pb) U-(D)]by Equation (6) 
(11) 
which permits upon multiplication and rearranging terms: 
Equation (11)= [PP a+ (1-P)(Pb )] U (E) + [P(l-Pa) 
+ ( 1 - Pa) + · ( 1 - P) ( 1 - Pb)] U ( D) . ( 12) 
Equation (12) =[P Pa+ (1 - P)Pb] U (E) + [1 - PP a -
- (1 - P)Pb] U (D) (13) 
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(14) 
where P4 is defined as in Equation (5). 
Similarly, the utility of the second lottery ticket is: 
U[P'(A,B) = P4 ' U(E) + (1-P4 ') U (D). (15) 
At this point by comparing Equations (14) and (15)j 
since U(E) > U(D) by Equation (6a) 9 the first lottery ticket 
will have the higher utility value if and only if P.:1, > P/. 
It has been shown in Equation (5) that this condition also 
assures that that lottery ticket will be preferred. 
Thus, it has been shown that the convention of Equation 
(6) will always assign a higher utility number to the pre-
ferred lottery ticket as is required. 
Construction of a Cardinal Utility Index 
Consider a lottery ticket which offers two prizes~ 
first prize is an all-expense paid three-week vacation in 
Europe, booby prize is one month's subscription to the local 
newspaper. Suppose the odds in winning are one in one thou= 
sand; that is, the probability of winning is 0.001 and the 
probability of losing (booby prize won) is 0.999. Suppose 
also that the prospective ticket purchaser is interviewed, 
and from psychological information as to how he views the 
utility of these two prizes (the method of establishing this 
utility comparison will follow), the vacation is assigned 
4000 utiles (the unit of utility measurement) and the paper 
subscription at one utile. Then, the N - M utility conven-
tion requires that the lottery ticket be evaluated at 
(0~001)(4000) + (0.999)(1) = 4.999 utiles. 
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More generally, if a lottery ticket offers two prizes, 
A with probability P and B with probability (1-P), and if 
their respective utilities at U(A) and U(B), then the 
utility of the lottery ticket, L, is defined to be 
U(L) = PU(A) + (1- P) U (B). (16) 
This simple ca+culation is all that is required in the 
N - M evaluation of the utility of a lottery ticket, once the 
individual's utility evaluation of the prizes is known. The 
crucial question is how to determine the utility of these 
prizes. 
In principle, this is accomplished by an extension of 
the preceding convention in Equation (16). For this pur-
pose a special (artificial) lottery ticket is designed that 
will serve as a standard of comparison. Consider two 
extreme prizes, E and D, representing eternal bliss and 
damnation. The standard lottery ticket, which is designated 
as S(P), offers an individual E with probability P and D 
with probability (1-P), where the probability number P is 
unspecified and is left to vary over a range of values. If 
two arbitrary utility numbers are assigned to E and D, pay 
U(E) = 100 and U(D) = 1. 
Now, the next step requires that any ordinary prize, A, 
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be assigned a utility value. For some values of Pin the 
standard lottery ticket, S(P), the individual will prefer 
S(P) to A, and for other values of P, the reverse will be 
true. For example, if P = 1 (certainty of eternal bliss), 
he will surely prefer S(P) to A, and if P = 0 (certainty of 
damnation), he will prefer A to S(P). It is, therefore, 
plausible that there will be some in-between value of ~a' at 
which an individual is indifferent between A and S(Pa). 
Once this indifference probability has been established, 
there is no difficulty in finding the utility of A. For A 
must have the same utility value as S(Pa), since an indif--
ference exists on the part of the individual. But, the 
utility of this standard lottery ticket, U[S(Pa)J, is easily 
calculated with the aid of the N - M convention of Equation 
(16): 
U[S(P a)] = P aU(E) + 1(1- Pa) U (D) = 0.4(100) + 0.6(1) = 40.9 
utiles if the indifference probability is found 
to be Pa= 0.4. 
Thus, in order to find a utility number which repre-
sents some individual's attitude toward any prize, X, he is 
interviewed or observed to find out the probability, Px' at 
which he is indifferent between the standard lottery ticket, 
S(Px) and X. The utility of Xis then evaluated using the 
standard of Equation (16) to determine the utility of S(Px). 
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Expected Utility Versus Expected Payoff 
One feature of the N - M utility convention Equation 
(16) should be pointed outo According to this rule, a lot-
tery ticket is evaluated at the expected value of its utili-
ties and not at the expected value of the prizes themselves. 
Consider a lottery ticket whose prizes, A and B, are 
amounts of moneyo Let these amounts and their respective 
utilities be shown as: 
A B 
Prize Value, dollars $1,000 $100 
Prize Value, utility 80 20 
Probability p 1-P 
The standard expected dollar value of the lottery 
ticket is 
P($1000) + (1 - P)($100) 
if P = 0.3 
then the expected dollar value of the lottery ticket is 
0.3($1000) + 0.7($100) = $370. 
In terms of the N - M utility concept, the expected 
utility value would be 
P(80) + (1- P)(20) = 24 + 14 = 38 utiles. 
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Utility as a Preference Indicator 
The use of utility as a preference indicator for 
alternative choices has the virtue of allowing for the con-
sideration of diminishing or increasing marginal utility. 
For example, a gain of $1000 may not be worth 10 times the 
gain of $100, particularly if there is a desperate need for 
$100. And, likewise, the probable gain of $100,000 profit 
to a manager may not be offset by an equiprobable loss of 
$100,000 if the organization has a minimum security require-
ment of no loss greater than $50,000 since this would com-
pletely deplete the working capital of the organization. 
The second use of utility measures as a guide in 
decision-making is that it may be a device to promote 
consistent action. The N - M utility concept proposes a 
system for determining an individual's utility function so 
that uncertain events may be evaluated in some consistent 
manner. With utility values explicitly stated, alternatives 
can be evaluated and selected that follow an individual's 
true preferences to achieve consistency in decision-making. 
Why be concerned with consistency? One reason in sup-
port of con~istency is that it permits a person to work in 
the most effective manner toward some goal. Inconsistency 
causes a person to meander, act in opposite ways to previous 
actions, possi-bly nullifying earlier gains. As pointed out 
by Davidson ( 18, p. 2) if a person makes decisions inconsist-
ent with the view of maximizing expected utility, he does 
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not have a rational pattern of preferences and expectations. 
Inconsistency can also lead to frustration; i.e., 
acting one way one minute and another the next creates con-
fusion and tension within the individual. As Dean M. R. 
Lohmann, College of Engineering, Oklahoma State University, 
has said before his classes many times, "One of the charac-
teristics of a good leader is that he makes it easy for 
people to follow him." Dean Lohmann has elaborated exten-
sively on the virtue of communications in accomplishing ob-
jectives. The elaboration emphasizes that managers are 
required to communicate in a manner so that they are under-
stood by those to whom they communicate, The essence of it 
all is that using inconsistent language in communicating 
about objectives, incentives, and methods of accomplishment 
increases the difficulty of determining: "What's he trying 
say?" "This week we go north. " "Last week we went south. " 
"Does anyone know where we are trying to go?" 
The fact that consistent action by maximizing expected 
utility is advanced as a recommended, or normative, guide 
does not intimate that all people are consistent. It is a 
commonplace observance that they are not. However, this 
does not destroy the need for pointing out such illogic or 
inconsistency and saying, "This is a more effective way to 
work toward some goal; it is only a tool, use it if you 
Will. II 
Jacob Marschak (20, p. 186) notes: 
It is not asserted that norms are obeyed by all or 
even a sizable portion of people, just as logicians 
and mathematicians do not assert that all or a 
majority of the people are immune to errors of lo~ic 
or arithematic. It is merely recommended that these 
errors be avoided.- Recommended norms and habits are 
not the same thing. 
The concept of using expected utility value as a 
decision guide also has another advantage over expected 
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monetary value. It has been a criticism of expected mone-
tary value that it overlooks the consequence of variance on 
individual preference; that is, expected value is really a 
weighted value. As such.a measure, it focuses attention on 
the mean value. Yet, there may be varying ranges of pos-
sible outcomes from a large loss to a large gain, which 
strongly influence an. individual's decision, regardless of 
the mean value. Expected utility value overcomes this 
objection by incorporating these variances directly into the 
computations. ·A large loss may be assigned a large negative 
utility by the individual, or he may assign a very large 
positive utility to a large increment of wealth, thus bring-
ing the influence of variance into the decision. 
A speci!ic,manner, to allow for variance·i~ .implied by 
Marschak (20) and can take the form: 
= where ux = expected corrected value of utility 
0 = an unspecified constant 
-u = expected uncorrected value of utility x 
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k = weight given the variance of utility 
values for U where'X = n when n = 1, x 
2, ... ' n for each nth uncorrected 
utility outcome of a course of action. 
Then, it is possible to solve fork for indifference of 
choice between two alternatives~ The determined value of k 
is compared with the subjective weight, ks_,_ which ha~ been 
given to· the .variance ·by:·the decisi.ow-maker. Thei:i, ·.if 
k8 = k each alternative is equally acceptable, 
ks> k the alternative with the smaller variance 
is preferred, 
ks< k the alternative with the larger variance 
i$ prefe~red. 
Contradictions 
A number of critical comments have been made by Allais 
(22), Edwards (23), Friedman and Savage (24), and Mosteller 
and Nagee (25) implying that there is no reliability at-
tached to measures of cardinal utility because of the in-
consistencies whicha·number of.experiments have shown. 
~ .. 
The most interesting and relevant arguments against the 
expected utility maxim involve specific cases in which indi-
viduals, after careful deliberation, choose alternatives in-
consistent with the .maxim. The situations are reasonably· 
simple, the human choice fairly definite, the contradiction 
between choice and maxim apparently escapable. Either the 
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conclusion must be that the expected utility maxim is not 
the criterion of rational behavior, or else the human being 
has a natural propensity toward irrationality, even in 
thoughtful situations. Markowitz (24, p. 219) notes three 
vivid examples that have been devised to show either (a) 
that rational and reasonable men choosing among simple 
alternatives contradict the expected utility maximum , or (b) 
that the II wrong II choices which were made prove individuals 
do act irrationally. Markowitz shows with simple clarity 
that human beings do act in an irrational manner. The 
examples will not be cited except to note the difficulty 
that individuals face in assessing alternative outcomes 
having probability distributions accounts for a major por-
tion of the irrationality. It is no further afield to 
mention the analogous situation that prevailed in many in-
dustrial situations before discounted cash flow concepts 
were accepted as aids in decision-making. Before their 
advent, did managers make irrational decisions? Not neces-
sarily; they made rational decisions given that the same 
decision would have been reached by any other individual 
given the same knowledge, experience, and objectives . 
Since 1959, beginning with Grayson's (26) major con-
tribution in the application of utility theory, the refine-
ment of utility measurement as an aid in decision-making has 
had increasing acceptance. The most notable contributions 
in support of the theoretical as well as empirical applica-
tions of utility theory have been made by Farrar (27) and 
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Kaufman (28). Chapter IV will demonstrate the.application 
of the model.for determining choice behavior under the ex-
pected utility maxim. 
CHAPTER IV. 
THE HEURISTIC APPLICATION OF UTILITY MODELS IN THE . 
ENVIRONMENT OF CHOICE ACTIVITY 
As noted earlier, in every type of organization, for 
whatever purpose the organization serves, several incentives 
are necessary and accompanied by a degree of persuasion so 
that,to the recipient, available incentives appear adequate 
in order to secure and maintain the contribution of required 
effort to the organization. The difficulties of securing a 
means of offering incentives, of avoiding the conflict of 
incentives, and of making effective persuasive efforts are 
readily conceded. The difficulty lies in 'the determination 
of the precise combination of incentives and of persuasion 
that will be both effective and feasible consonant with the 
resources of the organization. The delicacy of the adminis-
tration of a scheme of inducements causes it to be the most 
unstable of the elements of the cooperative system. Ex-
' 
ternal variables, as well as internal vari ables, aff ect the 
stability of the scheme of inducements. In short, the 
tendency of an organization to fail is ever-present. The 
tendency towards instability, the loss of equilibrium, re-
quires a deliberate att endance and growth of the scheme of 
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inducements under an antagonistic environment. The effi-
ciency of the organization in this environment is measured 
by its survival. Survival requires the maintenance of an 
equilibrium of organizational activities through the satis-
faction of the motives of individuals sufficient to induce 
these activities. An organization, then, is a system of 
cooperative human activities, the functions of which are the 
creation and distribution of utilities to those whose con-
tribution is required by the organization. 
The equilibrium of the organization economy requires 
that it shall generate and exchange sufficient utility so 
that it is able to turn to command and exchange the per-
sonal services of which it is constituted. The accomplish-
ment of equilibrium requires that through the application of 
these services the appropriate supplies of utilities which, 
when distributed to the contributors, insure the continuance 
of appropriate contributions of utilities from them. And, 
as each individual contributor requires a surplus of utility 
for his act of exchange of energy with the organizat i on, the 
organization can survive only as it secures by exchange 
(creation) a surplus of utilities in its own internal econ-
omy. If the operations of the organization result in 
deficit, that is, if it is unable to meet the demand for 
utility by the contributors, it is less and less able to 
acquire the contributions through which its activity func-
tions. The demand on the organization is for utility, it 
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cannot supply more than it has. If it has enough utility, 
it has the resources for survival. The securing of the ap-
propriate combination of the elements of the organization to 
produce utility is the basis for the endurance of coopera-
tive systems. The function of management is to provide for 
the securing and distribution of utility appropriate to the 
demands of the contributors to the organization. 
Unfortunately, the executive in the role of decision 
maker attempting to maintain an organizational equilibrium 
faces an environment fraught with uncertainty. When time 
considerations are associated with perfect knowledge of the 
future, problems of error in decisions and planning do not 
arise since the environment is deterministic. Perfect knowl-
edge of the future does not exist; and, therefore, decision 
making must take place in an environment of uncertainty . 
Uncertainty, Risk, and Expectations 
When faced with the lack of perfect knowledge of the 
future, decision-making activities must take place in an 
environment of uncertainty. A decision-maker is faced with 
two types of eventualities or outcomes which affect plans 
for the future. One of these is risk; the other is 
uncertainty. 
Risk refers to variability or outcomes which are meas-
urable in an empirical or quantitative manner . Empi r i cal 
probabilities can be established a priori when the charac-
teristic parameters of the outcome distribution are known 
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beforehand or the statistical probability of variability can 
be established when (a) the sample size is large enough, (b) 
the observations are repeated in the relevant population, 
and (c) the observations are independently distributed as 
random variables. The concept of risk can be defined to 
mean that the parameters of the probability distribution can 
be established for outcomes that involve risk. 
Uncertainty is present when knowledge of the future is 
less than perfect in the sense that the parameters of the 
probability distribution cannot be determined. Uncertainty 
is, therefore, entirely of a subjective nature. It simply 
refers to anticipations of the future and is particularly 
associated to the mind of the individual decision-maker. 
Uncertainty arises because the decision-maker must formulate 
an "image of the future" in his mind, but has no quanti ta-
ti ve method by which these predictions can be verified 
except ex poste. 
Since knowledge of the future is so imperfect , managers 
normally expect that a range of outcomes, rather than a 
single outcome, is possible. Anticipations of the future 
can be formed, but there is no way that the manager can 
assemble enough homogeneous observations to predict the 
relevant probability distribution. While subjective prob-
abilities may be assigned to these anticipations, no method 
exists by which actual values may be numerically derived and 
assigned these anticipations. The ultimate assignment of a 
probability distribution is known in decision theory as the 
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assignment of subjective or personal probabilities. The 
idea has been discussed at some length by Savage (29, pp. 
27 and 57) who has proposed a technique to establish sub-
jective probabilities which is modified for presentation. 
It is most important to recognize that the derivation of 
these probabilities does not imply objectivity, or author-
ity, although some individuals often try to give them this 
interpretation. The developed probabilities are merely a 
form of language, permitting subjective judgment to be put 
into a more precise form to allow for further evaluation of 
the generation of a store of utility values. 
Suppose the following choices were offered to a manager 
faced with a decision: Select either the real world alter-
native or a hypothetical alternative which has the following 
respective outcomes: 
1. Real World Alternative (Increase Plant Size): 
Profit Increases. = $1000 with subjective 
probability Pi 
No Profit Increase = $0 with subjective 
probaoility P2 • 
2. Hypothetical Alternative 
Profit Increase = $1000 with known prob~ 
.,. ability of O. 25 
No Profit Increase= $0 with known probability 
of 0.75. 
The manager is asked which of these alternatives he 
would prefer. If the manager feels there is a "good" chance 
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of making the plant addition increase his profit, he will 
choose this alternative. If he feels the proposal to in-
crease plant size has "little" probability of making a 
profit, he will select the hypothetical alternative. By 
revising the associated probabilities in the hypothetical 
alternative, it is possible to find a point, after several 
revisions in the probabilities in hypothetical alternative 
have been made, where the man~er is indifferent in his 
preferences for the two alternatives. Say this indifference 
point occurs at a probability of 0.80 and 0.20 for the prof-
it results of $1000 and $0, respectively, for the hypotheti-
cal alternative. Thus, it can be inferred that the 
ti subjective probabilities" he associates with the results 
of a plant expansion are also 0.80 and 0.20, respectively, 
for a profit gain of $1000 and $0. 
This technique is demonstrated only for the value it 
has in the numerical development and ranking of subjective 
probabilities in order to utilize the following action on 
utility measures. Competency in the use of this technique 
is assumed in the following development. A cautionary word 
of advice is in order. The technique is deceptively simple 
and requires an appropriate level of familiarity and compe-
tency analogous to the system of ranking and rating in 
establishing benchwork jobs in wage and salary· 
administration. 
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The Development of a Utility Index 
In accordance with the theorems of Chapter III and 
empirical studies made by Farrar (27), Grayson (26), and 
Kaufman (28), it is possible to measure utility. If a per-
son can express preferences over a series of alternatives, 
then it is possible to associate utility values to the 
alternatives provided that there is an element of consistency 
in the individual's preference for utility. 
or 
Given that a man is offered two alternatives: 
1. Obtain $100 for certain 
2. Have a 50-50 chance of winning $500 or $0. 
And, if he replies that these two alternatives are about 
equal, i.e., he is indifferent between them, then these 
alternatives have the same utility. Another individual 
given this same choice of alternatives may feel that he has 
to have a 50-50 chance of winning $700 or $0 before he feels 
the alternatives are equal. This second individual has a 
different utility function. 
A series of such alternatives can be given to an indi-
vidual, using different amounts of money and different 
probabilities. His responses can be plotted on a graph con-
verting dollars into a utility function, measured in terms 
of utiles. 
In deriving a utility measure of money, certain arbi-
trary values of utility are assigned. This does not matter 
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since this scale is unique to a particular individual, thus 
the consistency axioms determine a linear utility function 
only up to its zero point and its value in utiles. Hence, 
the assigned values will be $0 = 0 utiles and $500 = 25 
utiles. 
From Chapter III, Equation (8): 
then 
solving for 
U(.A) = PU(B) + (1 -P) \T (C) , 
U($100) = .50(25) + .50(0) 
U($100) = 12.5 utiles. 
If this information were plotted on.a graph, the repre-
sentation would be similar to that shown in Figure 8. But 
this is merely a plot of one gamble, and, since only a 
limited number of utility-for-money values can be obtained, 
a number of gambles are presented to the individual. These 
results are also plotted. If there is an element of con-
sistency in the individual's preference for money, the re-
sults can be extended to form a general utility function for 
him. Inconsistency of choice displays itself in the utility 
values obbained . .As noted earlier, inconsistency has been 
demonstrated by a number of writers. Much of the incon-
sistency stems not from human preference and the expecte~ 
utility-maxim, but, rather, from misapplication or misinter-
pretation of the maxim • .A concise demonstration of this 






0 100 200 300 
Dollars 
400 500 
where: •=arbitrary value of utility 
o ::: calculated value of utility = l2o5 




discussion, normative application of the utility maxim re-
quires that if people prefer A to B to C, then they should 
not prefer C to A, if they are consistent. Inconsistency 
when recognized is brought to the attention of the individ-
ual somewhat as follows: "Look, this demonstrates the dif-
ficulty of attempting consistent behavior. You said you 
would choose this alternative, but a few moments later, with 
an identical position, you said you would not take this al-
ternative. This is inconsistent. Which of these two alter-
natives really represents your position?" 
After having this called to his attention, the individ-
ual may modify his preferences to bring them into consistent 
order. These inconsistencies are disturbing, but not unex-
pected. Modifying them is a process whereby the individual 
removes inconsistent behavior influences, so that he may 
select alternatives on a consistent basis. This pattern is 
not unlike that which often is observed in industry where 
project design is evaluated on a "consistency" basis. For 
example, if a 10,000 foot oil well r equires a 20 horsepower 
pumping system, the chief engineer is skeptical of the de-
sign criteria for the next oil well, ceteris paribus, if the 
project engineer recommends a 40 horsepower pumping system. 
The project engineer may volunteer, "That doesn't look right 
(consistent), let me go over my calculations again." In-
consistency, unfortunately, does not wear a badge, "Look, I 
am inconsistency," to warn the unsuspecting decision-maker 
of his foibles. 
The Experimental Development of a 
Utility Function 
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In order to develop the utility function of an individ-
ual, a series of decisions must confront him. so that a meas-
ure of utility for various sums of money may be determined. 
Since the type of decisions he must make are in the guise of 
a hypothetical game or gamble for which alternative deci-
sions must be made, it is quite essential that the frame of 
reference for decisions among alternatives accomodate the 
physical, social and economic environment in which the 
decision-maker normally operates. The utility function 
should be determined under choice-making situations that 
closely approximate the actual decision environment. In 
constructing the .gamble or hypothetical situation, three 
basic ingredients are necessary: the capital investment, . . 
the payoff or return, and the probability of success. 
For the monetary considerations of capital investment 
and return, present day values after taxes should be consid-
ered, since this is the realistic situation of the decision-
maker. The rate at which cash flows are discounted will 
depend on the firm's weighted cost of capital as a minimum, 
the maximum discount rate will be the investment opportunity 
rate available to the firm. A complete discussion of these 
techniques may be found in Thuesen and Fabrycky (30) and 
Bierman and Smidt (31). 
61 
Developing the Indifference Probability 
As an example, a decision-maker is offered an oppor-
tunity to accept or reject an investment opportunity where 
the required capital investment is $40,000, the total re-
turn (or positive cash flow) is $130,000, and the probabil-
ity of success of the investment is 0.70. That is, there is 
a subjective probability that the venture will return 
$130,000; there is also a (1- 0.70) or 0.30 probability of 
. failure of the venture. In symbols: 
Expected Utility= 0.70[Utility ($90,000)] 
+ 0.30[Utility -$40,000] 
Expected Utility= Utility Gain+ Utility Loss. 
Now, if this investment opportunity is acceptable to 
the decision-maker, the probability of success and failure 
are adjusted until he rejects this investment opportunity. 
If probability of success is 0.10 and that of failure 
is 0.90, then the expected gain is negative if the decision-
maker rejects this opportunity to risk a $40,000 investment. 
Finally, it is possible to adjust the probability of success 
to the point where the decision-maker is not sure whether to 
accept or reject. In effect, he is indifferent about the 
loss or gain and essentially feels the net effect of the in-
vestment borders on an expected utility value of zero. If 
this indifference level were found to be: 
Then 
P(Success) = Oo60 
P(Failure) = Oo40. 
(0.60)[Utility ($90,000)] + (.40)[Utility (-$40,000)] 
= 0 utiles. 
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The zero utiles represent status quo, which is merely a 
convenient convention without the loss of general 
application. 
It is necessary in building the utility function of an 
individual to be exceedingly clear about the representation 
of capital investment, cash flows and the concept of prob-
ability. The last item is the most difficult to display to 
the decision-maker •. A number of various demonstrations may 
be necessary ~n order to convey the meaning of probability 
to the decision-maker. The use of marble boards and dice 
may effectively introduce him to probability concepts. The 
necessary requirement is that he is able to attach the 
notion of probability to his decision environment. For an 
oil marketer, the frame of reference is in terms of profit-
ably operating service stations. A 0.10 probability means 
that 1 out of 10 service stations will not be profitable for 
any number of reasons, such as traffic density, station 
density, and so forth. To a manufacturer of automobiles, 
·· certain sytles and models sell better than others; some 
models lose money, some do not. How does he view probability? 
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Could he conceive of one model in ten being rejected by the 
buying public? Could he conceive of eight models in ten 
being successful? Does this mean the same to him as an 0.80 
chance of success for any model? The nomenclature seems 
trivial, but the area of greatest difficulty in establishing 
a utility function is to have a decision-maker grasp the 
"odds" - the probability - of success or failure of a proj-
ect as it influences his acceptance, rejection or indiffer-
ence evaluation of an alternative. 
Description of Evaluation Form 
A form which can be used to obtain the indifference 
probabilities appears as Figure 9 together with psuedo val-
ues that represent the empirical results-of a test o The partial 
display is presented only to indicate the form and overlap 
of investment values to enable an evaluation of consistent 
behavior. The levels of investment and return must be 
realistic in terms of opportunities that the decision-maker 
' faces. Since a measure of his utility preference during the 
development of a utility function is to fairly represent his 
II real world" preference, the development of plausible oppor-
tunities should be given considerable thought. 
As an example, the manager of market development for a 
major glass company might be confronted with, "You have been 
considering the construction of a major warehouse on the 
West Coast. The cost will be $150,000; the return might be 
Indifference Reactions for Investment Opportunities 
Name 
~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
Organization ~--------~~~~--------~--~~~ Position 
Brief Description of Authority and Responsibility 
Total Net Derived 
Investment* Return Return Indifference 
Probabilit;y: 
$10 $ 20 $ 10 .90 
40 30 .70 
60 50 .40 
80 70 .35 
100 90 .30 
20 40 20 .90 
60 4o .70 
Bo 60 .60 
100 80 .55 
120 100 .50 
30 60 30 None~* 
Bo 50 .90 
100 70 .Bo 
120 90 .70 
140 110 .50 

























































*fnctho~ap.d of dollars. **None interprets that no probability of success is acceptable. 





$500,000 because of better customer service, inventory cost 
control and so on. Would you recommend this warehouse be 
built if there was a 0.90 probability of the $500,000 return 
occurring? Yes. All right, then, would you feel the ware-
house was ·a good investment if there was only a 0.10 chance 
of the return being $500,000? No. All right, now what if 
there was a 0.50 probability of the investment returning 
$500,000? Not quite sure? Let us say you might be indif-
ferent." Perhaps in a more detailed verbal exchange, the 
objective would be to build a set of indifference values 
that represent plausible situations faced by the decision-
maker. Figure 10 portrays what would possibly result as in-
different probabilities are evaluated as a utility function. 
Plotting Utility Functions 
If the results from the indifference probabilities were 
developed as follows: 
Investment Total Net Derived 
Payoff Revenue Indifference 
Probabilit;l 
$10,000 $ 20,000 10,000 0.80 
30,000 20,000 0.60 
40,000 30,000 0.60 
60,000 50,000 0.30 
100,000 90,000 0.20 
$20,000 40,000 20,000 0.90 
50,000 30,000 0.85 
120,000 100,000 0.40 ' 
the next step would be to assign 0.0 utility to $00. Next, 
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Figure 10. Rough Sketch of Data of Figure 9 
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equation for the first point plot is: 
.80[Utility ($10,000)] + .20[Utility (-$10,000)] ; O. 
As the utility of $10,000 was set at -1 utile, then, by 
solution for the utility of $10,000, 0.25 utiles represents 
the utility of $10,000. 
The three utile points (-1 3 O, 0.25) are plotted 
against the three net revenue points (-$10,000, $0, $10,000). 
In a similar manner, the utility values for other net reve-
nue points at the $10,000 investment level are obtained and 
plotted over the range of -$10,000 and $90,000. 
The next series of indifferent probabilities at the 
$20,000 investment level are plotted. The overlapping net 
revenues from the previous investment level serve as an in-
ternal check on the consistency of the decision-maker. This 
series of points require that an arbitrary utility level for 
-$20~000 be set. This is done by reference to the first set 
of points to extrapolate a utility value for the loss of the 
investment sum. This arbitrary value may require adjustment 
during the plotting of this series to determine if the over-
lapping net revenues can be made to possess consistent 
utility values. 
A plotted utility curve developed by Grayson (26 1 
p. 306) through indifference probability evaluation is re-
produced as Figure 11. The general interpretation of this 
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Figure 11. Plot of Derived Utility Values 
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success probabilities before he is willing to risk invest-
ment funds. Also, the interpretation indicates that the 
possible loss of $200,000 could never be counterbalanced by 
any increment of gain. The $200,000 loss may possibly rep-
resent the loss of ownership of the firm. 
The Use of Utility Functions 
The potential for evaluating the probability distribu-
tions of various alternatives becomes apparent when the 
weight of a gain or loss of money represents something 
other than the expected monetary value of an alternative. 
Not only does decision-making by the utility maxim provide 
for consistency for choosing alternative methods so as to 
provide for consistent behavior in reaching organization 
objectives, it also provides for a method of delegating 
decision-making authority in the allocation of organization 
assets. It seems plausible, as refinements are made in the 
development of utility functions, that utility functions 
will represent objective criteria of the firm so that the 
president of an organization can say to a subordinate, "Here 
is our company's utility function for money. It reflects 
the company's preferences for large losses, large gains, and 
for those expected values between these extremes." 
The chances for consistent action throughout the firm 
would be greatly improved. Personal observations in com-
pleting this research in utility concepts uncovered two 
interesting observations made by industrialists who perhaps 
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may not have been consistent with goals of the organization. 
Observation 1: 11 We are here to produce oil. That's 
my goal. If production is increasing, 
I'm happy." This executive, however, was 
producing oil at a cost of $4.40 per 
barrel against a market value of $3.12 
a barrel. 
Observation 2: 11 Costs are our concern -- keep costs 
down and profit will take care of 
itself." The executive with this 
objective would reach the break-even 
point where costs would exceed a de-
clining revenue in 18 months. 
A Comparison of Expected Money Value 
and Expected Utility Value 
Using the utility function of Figure 11, the following 
comparison is made, in tabular form, of three mutually ex-
clusive alternatives (Table I on following page). 
From the data of Table I, the following comparisons may 
be made: 
Alternative Alterhative Alternative 
Results No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 
Expected Money Value* $75,000 $62,000 $55,500 
Expected Utility Value 4.1 Utiles 5.1 Utiles 5.3 Utiles 
TABLE I 
TABULATION OF EXPECTED MONEY VALUE AND EXPECTED UTILITY VALUE 
Alternative No. 1 Alternative No. 2 Alternative No. 3 
Investment= $50,000 Investment= $40,000 Investment= $20,000 
(A) (B) (C) {A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
Net Utility Probability Net Utility Probability Net Utility Probability 
Revenue of' (A) of Occur- Revenue of (A) of Occur- Revenue of (A) of Occur-
rence (A.) rence (A) rence (A) 
$-. 50,000 ·- 7 o.4o $- 40,000 - 3 0.10 $- 20,000 - 1 0.05 -, 
100,000 + 8 0.20 60,000 + 5 0.60 50,000 + 5 0.65 
150,000 +12 0.30 100,000 + 8 0.30 80,000 + 7 0.30· 
-
200,000 fl.7 0.10 - - - - -




where Expected Money Value= EMV = ~ (p.) ($E. ) 
l l 
i=l 
where: pi = subjective probability of ith event 
occurring 
$Ei money value of 
.th event = l 
n 
where Expected Utility Value= EUV =' (p. )(UE.) L l 1 
i=l 
where: subjective probability of ith event 
UEi = utility value of ith event. 
As can be seen, if the expected money value of an 
alternative is the objective, then Alternative No. 1 is 
preferred. However, if the utility maxim is applied, then 
the weight given a possible loss of -$50,000 is not offset 
by a gain of $50,000 since the loss of $50,000 has greater 
disutility than the gain of $50,000 possesses utility. 
Consequently, the expected utility value of Alternative 
No. 3, 5.3 utiles, possesses the largest expected utility 
value and would be the choice of the utility maximizer. A 
number of other investment decision criteria could also be 
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modified with a utility index to consider payout time, aver-
age annual earning power, and per cent profit at the organ-
ization's current rate of return. 
Empirical Studies and Comments 
Grayson (26) has done the most complete empirical 
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studies to date in measuring utility functions of decision-
makers who drill oil and gas wells. His study utilized the 
oil industry environment because of the inherent acknowl-
edged risk and uncertainty attached to the drilling of oil 
and gas wells. Yet, even though the individuals whose 
utility was measured were usually confronted with risk and 
uncertainty, G~ayson (26, p. 313) observed these 
difficulties: 
1. Some operators do not use numerical probabil-
ities in their decisions, and they found it 
strange to try to reach a decision on the 
basis of probabilities. 
2. Some operators could not view probabilities 
as objective -- they further discounted the 
given probabilities. · 
3. When probabilities were similar to those they 
actually experienced in their environment, 
they gave consistent evaluations to the alter-
natives. However, when the probabilities 
ranged away from a familiar level, they had 
difficulty in pursuing consistent mental 
processes. 
4. When dollar values exceeded an individual's 
customary maximum range of investment funds 
he experienced great difficulty in attaching 
a value· of indifference to say, $300,000 when 
he customarily invested funds to a maximum of 
$50,000. 
On the plus side, several decision-makers felt the 
utility function would serve a useful purpose in defining 
consistent behavior for the firm. One firm, Eason Oil 
Company, has inc.orporated the utility function into its 
general evaluation criteria of investment opportunities 
(28, p. 57). 
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Misapplication and Misinterpretation 
of the Utility Maxim 
A great deal of theoretical conflict as well as 
empirical misinterpretation exists in the application of the 
utility maxim. In order to present a summation and possible 
resolution of the conflict, two situations are analyzed: 
Situation 1 
Alternative A: Certainty of $1,000 
·~Alternative B: A 0.10 probability of $5,000 
Situation 2 
A 0.89 probability of $1,000, and 
A 0.01 probability of $00. 
Alternative C: A probability of 0.11 of getting 
$1,000, and a probability of 0.89 
of getting $00. 
----Alternative D: A probability of O .10 of getting 
$5,000, and 
a probability of 0.90 of getting 
$00. 
Given the above choices, in Situation 1 subjects often 
prefer A to B, and in Situation 2, these same subjects pre-
fer D to C. This choice of A> Band D > C clearly contra-
diets the expected utility maxim. 
This may be seen by letting 
U($5000) = U(5) 
U($1000) = U(l) 
U($ 00) = U(O) 
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Then the choices indicate that the preference of A> B 
is: 
lU(l) > [0.1 U(5) + .89U(l) + .01 U(O)] , 
but, if [0.89 U(O) - .89 U(l)] is added to both sides of the 
inequality, then 
O.llU(l) + 0.89U(O) > 0.1U(5) + o.9u(o) 
which indicates that an individual who prefers A> B, then 
·must. prefe~ .· C > D, a. contradiction of his earlier choice 
of D > C. The expected utility maxim must not be valid, or 
is it? At stake is the utility maxim unless individuals 
reverse themselves given the same alternative choices in 
another format. If this is the case, that individuals are 
indeed mislead by concepts of expected utility values, then 
the utility maxim is still acceptable. 
Using the previous Alternatives of A, B, C, and D, the 




















(c) $1,000 with 
or certainty 
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p = • 11 ........0hoice 
(d) p : 10111 I J5,000 
·~$00 
It can be shown now that these new "forms".. of decision 
choices exactly represent those in the original format, but 
now these same individuals overwhelmingly select, for 
Situation 1, a> b, and for Situation 2, c > d, a. reversal of 
the earlier preference of A> B and D > C. 
To show the equality of expected values for the pre-
vious choice situations, the following is given: 
A= certainty of $1000 
a= $1000(0.89 + 0.11) = certainty of $1000 
B = 0.10($5000) + 0~89($1000) + 0.01($00) 
b = o:11(i~)(5000) + 0.89($1000) + O.ll({i)($00) 
= 0.10(5000) + 0.89($1000) + 0.01($00) 
C = 0.11($1,000) + 0.89($00) 
c = 0.11($1,000) + 0.89($00) 
D = 0.11($5,000) + 0.90($00) 
d = O.ll(i~)($5000) + 0.11({1 )($00) + .89($00) 
The explanation for the inconsistency primarily results 
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from the greater focus brought to bear on the weight effect 
of a probability distribution that can be visualized when 
"almost the same," i.e., 0.10 and 0.11, probabilities are 
identified more dramatically as in the arrow diagram of 
choice situations. 
The General Source of Conflict 
The error more specifically lies in the misinterpreta-
tion of the notion [ aP + ( 1 ~ a)QJ wherein probabilities are 
mixed. If event P has a probability distribution (a} and 
event Q has a probability distribution (1-a), and Pis con-
sidered to be exactly as good as Q, then the expected util-
ity maxim asserts that having either of these with certainty 
is exactly equal to the equiprobable chance of receiving 
either one. The probability distribution in the latter case 
is C!)P + C!)Q., which is considered exactly as good as P or 
Q, which implies diversification does no good. 
This is a non-sequitu~. The probability distribution 
associated with the flip of a coin to choose between event P 
and event Q is not the same probability distribution of 
utility values which results from investing resources 
equally in each event; assuming this is a realistic possi-
bility. As an extreme example, if there were 10 events all 
with the same mean and same probability distribution, and if 
the utility derived from an investment in each of these 
events were uncorrelated, then diversification among the 10 
events would considerably reduce the utility variance to be 
realized since 
s- = x 
where: 
s- = variance of the mean utility of the events x 
sx = variance of utility of an event 
n = number of events. 
Choosing a single event at random would result in 
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exactly the same probability distribution of utility as in-
vesting resources in an event outright. Clearly, the mixing 
of probabilities and the mixing of utility should not be 
confused. 
It can be argued that the assumption that "if P is 
exactly as good as Q, then either is exactly as good as 
(a P) + (1 - a)Q '' should be doubted or rejected in the case 
of probabilities because there are other things to which the 
assumption clearly does not apply. But, the fact that the 
assumption does not apply to buying a suit of clothes, plan-
ning a trip or blending wheat flour does not affect its rea-
sonableness or unreasonableness when applied to probabilities. 
The fact that in.dividuals may prefer scotch to beer does not 
mean that people will prefer a mixture of 0.50 scotch and 
0.50 beer. So the assumption does not necessarily hold. 
But, the assumption is still consistent with the statement 
that "If a drink of scotch is preferred to a drink of beer, 
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then a 50-50 chance of a drink of scotch is preferred to the 
certainty of a drink of beer." 
The Resolution of Conflict 
The area of conflict over contradictions versus the 
expected utility maxim will be cleared if conflicts can be 
viewed from a set of evaluatory principles set forth as 
axioms. The following axioms would seem to serve this 
purpose: 
Axiom I: If P and Qare two probability distribu-
tions of utility outcomes, then either P 
is preferred to Q, or Q is preferred to 
P, or both are considered equal in 
preference. 
Axiom II: If P is considered at least as good as Q, 
and Q is considered at least as good as 
R, then Pis considered to be at least as 
good as R. 
Axiom III: If a probability distribution of utility 
Pis preferred to a probability distribu-
tion of utility Q, and if R is any prob-
ability distribution at all, then 
A probability (a) of obtaining P 
and a probability of (1-a) of ob-
taining R is preferred to a prob-
ability (a) of obtaining Q and (1 - a) 
of obtaining R, given that (a)>O. 
In other words, if Pis preferred to Q,, if (a) is 
greater than zero, and if R is any distribution whatever, 
then 
aP + (1-a)R > aQ, + (1-a)R 
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which says that aP + CL - a)R is the over-all probability if 
an individual would choose P if the opportunity arises; 
aQ, + ( 1 - a)R is the over-all probability of Q, if an indi vi d-
ual would choose Q if the opportunity arises. If it is 
assumed that different ways of generating the same probabil-
ity distributions are equally good, then the statement that 
P should be chosen instead of Q, whatever (a) or R, is the 
same statement that aP + ( l - a)R should be preferred to 
aQ, + (1-a)R. 
In the following game matrix, the previous arguments 
become apparent if Pis preferred to Q: 
(a) (1-a) 
Choice A p R 
Choice B Q R 
since Choice A will always be made regardless of R, a, and 
( 1 ... a). 
CHAPTER V 
THE ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION 
OF UTILITY 
As mentioned in Chapters I and II, the essential goal 
of a manager is organization survival. In effect, a vital, 
and, indeed, necessary element for survival is the willing-
ness of contributors to contribute their individual efforts 
to the organization seeking to survive. As Barnard (2, 
p. 140) has so aptly put it, "The net satisfactions which 
induce a man to qontribute his efforts to an organization 
result from the positive advantages as against the disadvan-
tages which are entailed." The organization, and more 
specifically, the manager must seek to generate those types 
of incentives particularly and singularly attractive to the 
particular contributors whose contributions are vital to the 
organization's survival. 
As noted by Barnard (2, pp. 139-160), the economy of 
incentives requires an extraordinary degree of delicacy in 
the application of incentives to assure that an individual 
recognizes them as being sufficiently adequate to maintain 
his contribution of effort to the organization. However, 
since all incentives have a direct or an indirect cost of 
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acquisition, the manager seeks under the constraint of lim-
ited resources to balance the distribution of utility con-
sistent with its supply. Since an economy of distribution 
is required, the distribution of utility must be propor-
tioned to the value and effectiveness of the contributory 
efforts required by the organization. 
At the outset, the manager is faced with the require-
ment to produce a "store" of utility from the efforts of the 
contributors, so that, in turn, he may dispense the 
"produced" utili, ty to contributors in such a fashion so as 
to insure continuity of the distribution process necessary 
for organization survival. 
The organization can·be represented as a production 
unit whose product is utility. It is the manager who de-
cides how much and what combination of input factors will 
generate the sufficient amount of utility to maintain equi-
librium. A manager, by his decisions, transforms inputs 
into outputs according to the capability of the contributors. 
The difference between total output utility and total input 
utility, which are each determined by the summation of in-
dividual utilities, represents whether or not the organiza-
tion can acquire, convert and distribute a sufficient amount 
of utility so that it may survive. 
The analysis of such a system for the production of 
utility is first developed for the relatively simple case in 
which two utility inputs are combined for a single utility 
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output. The system is then extended for the general case of 
n inputs. 
Inputs and the Production of Utility 
The input to any organization is viewed as the efforts 
of individual contributors. The effort to contribute finan-
cial resources, the effort to operate a milling machine, and 
the effort to contribute any necessary factor of production 
are specifically what permit the organization to achieve 
its objectives. For a given time period of production, in-
puts are classified as fixed or variable. Given a time 
period, a fixed input is necessary for production, but its 
quantity is invariant with respect to the quantity of out-
put produced. The costs of fixed utility inputs are in-
curred by the manager regardless of II short-run II optimizing 
decisions. The necessary quantity of a variable utility in-
put depends upon the quantity of utility output. The dis-
tinction between fixed and variable inputs is temporal. 
Inputs which are fixed for one period of time are variable 
when considered for a longer time period. All utility in-
puts are variable, given a sufficient period of time for 
adjustment. 
The assumption underlying the development of rational 
behavior for the decision-maker is that he attempts to maxi-
mize the residual utility of the organization's activities 
so that he has, firstly, enough utility to satisfy current 
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demands of the contributors and, secondly, a surplus of 
utility to accommodate the uncertain stability of organiza-
tion's environment. 
The Production Function 
Consider a .s~mple production function in which a 
decision-maker utilizes two variable inputs, Xi and~, and 
one or more fixed inputs in order to produce a Q quantity of 
utility. The production function states the output quantity, 
q, as a function of variable inputs x1.i" of Xi. ancl. x2 of ~, or 
(1) 
Unlike the utility functions of Chapter III, the utility 
I 
production function for Equation (1) is assumed to be a 
single-valued continuous function with continuous first and 
second order partial derivatives defined only for non-
negative values of utility input and utility output. 
The decision-maker may use any number of combinations 
of Xi and ~ for the production of a given level of utility 
output. Since Equation (1) is continuous, the possible 
combinations of inputs are infinite. The best utilization 
of any particular input combination is an economic problem, 
since the acquisition of utility is assumed to have an asso-
ciated cost. The selection of the best input combination 
for the production of a particular output level depends upon 
the costs of input factors and the revenue received from the 
output activity. This combination is subject to economic 
analysis. 
Input and output utility levels are taken as rates of 
flow of utility per unit of time. The period of time for 
which such flows, i.e., the short-run production function, 
are defined is subject to three general restrictions: 
1. It must be sufficiently short so that levels 
of fixed inputs cannot be altered. 
2. It must be sufficiently short so that the 
production is not altered through technolog-
ical improvements. 
3. It must be sufficiently long to allow the 
completion of the necessary processes to 
generate output utility. 
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The analysis to accommodate the "long run" relaxes re-
striction number one and allows the time period to be of 
sufficient length to allow for the variation of all inputs. 
Productivity Curves 
In the short run, the total productivity of utility of 
input factor Xi, when producing a Q quantity of utility when 
input factor x2 of ~·•·is held constant and assigned the fixed 
0 value x2 is 
q = f ( Xi , X~ ) • ( 2) 
The input level of x~ is treated as a parameter, and q 
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becomes a function of X1 alone. The relation between q and 
X1 can be altered as levels of x2 are changed. Normally, an 
increase of x2 will reduce the amount of x1 required to pro-
duce utility at each feasible output level. Leftwich (32, 
pp. 107-135) gives a very complete graphical presentation of 
this development, and Allen (33, pp. 190 and 341) gives a 
complete mathematical explanation. 
In a similar manner, the average productivity (AP) of 
X1, its total productivity divided by its quantity, is 
(3) 
The marginal productivity (MP) of X1 is the rate of 
change of its total productivity with respect to its varia-
tions in its quantity, i.e., the partial derivative of 
Equation (1) with respect to x1, and is 
(4) 
For the production of utility in an organization, pro-
duction functions satisfy the almost universal law of 
diminishing margin.al utility: the l"IP of X1 will eventually 
decline as x1 is increased with x2 remaining·fixed. It is 
intuitively seen that if the capital investment in produc-
tion equipment is held fixed and the variable input of labor 
is increased; then at some level of labo~ input, continued 
increases in labor serve to reduce the total output as 
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individuals become so numerous that they impede effective 
movement. As this situation occurs, it is conceivable that 
the output of utility is likewise hindered. 
An.other characteristic of production functions is that 
the ability of one input factor to substitute for another 
input has a relationship known as the Marginal Rate of 
Substitution (MRS). This refers to the amount by which one 
resource factor (Xi) is decreased as the input of another 
resource factor (X1 ) is increased by one unit 
The Cobb-Douglas Function 
While a number of production functions for describing 
the output of.utility 9f an organization have application, the 
Cobb-Douglas function appears to have more general applica-
bility for utility . functions since it assumes constant 
elasticity of utility production with diminishing marginal 






X~ = an input factor, i, raised to the nth power. 
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Characteristics of the Cobb-Douglas Function 
The virtuosity of the Cobb-Douglas function has been 
demonstrated by Heady (34, pp. 59, 68, 143) to have partic-
ular importance in generating response relationships between 
input factors and products when utility functions are empha-
sized as a basis for decision-making. 
A production function denoting constant returns to 
scale is said to be homogeneous of the first degree denoting 
that, if input of each factor is multiplied by a constant 
amount, the product will be increased in a like ratio. The 
marginal and average productivity of all factors depends 
only on the ratio between the amounts of the factors and not 
on the amounts of the factors. If a p~oduction function is de-
fined as Y = f(X1 , ~) ;and the input of both X1 and Xz is multi-
plied by a constant, k, the right side of the equation be-
comes f (kX1 , k~ ) and the production of utility will be 
increased by the same proportion (to kY) only if the func-
tion is homogeneous of the first degree. In other words 9 
the condition must exist for 
f (kX1 , kXz ) = kf (Xi , Xz ) = kY (5) 
denoting that the utility is increased by the same constant 
ratios as all input factors. 
It is possible to illustrate the difference between 
functions which denote constant returns to scale and those 
which illustrate economies of scale and diseconomies of 
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scale. For example, a production function for an organiza-
tion might be represented by 
where 
Y ~ utility 
C = capital input 
L = labor input. 
If each factor is multiplied by a constant, k, the right 
side of the equation becomes 
which becomes 
which simplifies to 
(6) 
Accordingly, the product will also be increased by the 
same ratio, k, since the power of k is one. Thus, 
to represent constant returns to scale. 
As has been demonstrated, the Cobb-Douglas function for 
Y = x?x?-q 
I . 
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represents constant returns to scale if 
ex. + ( l - ex.) = 1 • 
For economies of scale, then 
ex. + 1 - ex. > 1 
which is demonstrated by 
then 
and (7) 
for diseconomies of scale, then 
ex. + ( 1 - ex.) < 1 
which is demonstrated by 
Y Xo.5xo.3 = 1 2 , 
then 
and 
As an example, given a utility production function 
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where 
L = labor 
C = capital 
R = raw material 
since scale relationships refer to an increase in all re-
source inputs in fixed proportions, the increase in utility 
is the increase resulting, say from a 10 per cent increase 
in all input factors, which results in a 7.6 per cent in-
crease in produced utility. The calculations are 
where 
L = 2 
C = 4 
R = 5. 
When each input is increased by 10 per cent, then 
Or an increase in produced utility of 7.6 per cent when 
inputs have been increased by 10 per cent. The same result 
could have been obtained by adding the exponents of the in-
put variables which equal 0.76 which is the elasticity of 
production and is interpreted as a 1.0 per cent change in 
inputs represents a 0.76 per cent change in output.· The 
optimum levels of input will be discussed later. 
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Utility and Limited Resources 
Consider the simplest case of a manager who uses a 
single input (X) for the production of two outputs (Qi and 
Q2 ). Implicitly, the utility production function is, 
U( qi , ~ , x) (8) 
where 
qi = quantity of Qi output 
~ = quantity of ~ output 
x = quantity of X input 
and it is assumed that Equation (8) can be solved for 
x = u( qi , ~ ) · 
The cost of production in terms of input, X, is a func-
tion of the two outputs, 
c = Pi qi + P2 ~ 
where 
c = cost constraint 
Pi = cost of qi 
P2 = cost of ~· 











MUq1 = marginal utility of ql 
MU~ = margin.al utility of ~ 
Pi = price of ql 
P2 = price of Ch 
Note: The proof of Equation (12) is elementary 
and can be found in Leftwich (32, p. 62). 
Then, from Equation (9) 








The second order function, y ", to satisfy the maximum 
con4ition is obtained if 
au 
= a~ ; 
then ~'~/ = f11 + 2 f 12 (- ~) + f 2 2 (- ~) 2 < 0 (16) 





f1 f.z._ = P1 P2 (19). 
it is possible to substitute to obtain t'he slope of the in-
difference curve 
if Equation (11) is obtained by substitution of Equation 
(17), then a positive value of the slope of the utility 
(20) 
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curve is obtained to indicate it is convex to the origin. 
An Example 
where 
ql = output utility of product ql 
<12 = output ,utility of product <12 • 
c = $100 = P1 q1 - P2 <12 
where 
P1 = $2, price of x in ql. 
P2 = $5, price of x in gz. 
100 - 2 ql - 5qz = 0 
-100 + 2Sh 20 2 ql <12 = -5 = - 5 
ql ( 20 2 q1) = 20q1 2 q2l u = 5 - 5 
du 20 -
4 0 dq1 = 5 
ql = 
20 = 4 5 ql 
• 
• • ql = 25 
and gz = 20 - ;<25) = 10. 
The marginal utility of this Cobb-Douglas function is 
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ou 
<12 10 oq1 
::: = 
ou 
ql 25 a <12 = = 





.9:.9.i.. == - ~ = £2 = -2.5 = MRS d<J2 10 ql <12 
aq1 
Total utility= u = q1 <12 = (25)(10) = 250 utiles 
and 
which represents a rectangular hyperbola. 
And if 
Then the decision-maker should produce 25 units of qi or 10 
units of <12 to maximize utility under a budget constraint. 
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Optimization With the Lagrange Multiplier 
However, a more convenient method is to use an undeter-
mined Lagrange multiplier to optimize a function under con-
strained conditions. 
The general equation of utility, using the same nota~ 
tion as before, is 
or 




p.q. = o. 
1 1 
The optimal condition requires that utility be maximized 
subject to the following: 
where 
n 
M = u ( q1 , q2 , • • • , qn) + A [ C - L 
i=l 
p. q. J 
1 1 





To solve the constrained-maximization problem of the 
decision-maker who desires to maximize utility for a speci-
fied input of X, the partial derivatives of Equation (24) 
are set equal to zero: 




ar1 c -LP· q. o. Il = = J. J. 
i=l 
Solving for the Lagrange multiplier, A, 
• • • = (26) 
And in the frame of reference of Equation (26), A rep-





From previous notation the example is: 
U = ql 'J2 ( 29 ) 
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a l'1 IT' = $100 - $ 2q1 - $ 5~ = 0 . (36) 
Then, by subs ti tu ting the values for q1 and ~ into 
Equation ( 36) 
100 - $2(5A) - 5(2A) = 0 (37) 
100 = 20/\ 
A = 5 . 
Then, by substitution in Equations (33) and (34) and 
solving for q1 and ~ , 
and qz = 10 . (38) 
However, a secondary procedure allows the development 




since .9.z... = l2.l.. because the utility curve and the price ratio 
q1 P2 




100 = 2p,_ ql , (42) 
which indicates the demand for q1 in generating utility is 
represented by 
$100 by a similar computation, the demand for~ = ~~ 
2P2 
(43) 
if p1 = $2 and p2 = $5, then q1 = 25 units and ~ = 10 units. 
The General Equilibrium Model 
For the general equilibrium model, the utility function 
to maximize is represented by 









- A.Pi aq1 
au 
- A-P2 og;-









__! = A. = marginal utility for money·. (44) 
pi 
and any pair of output factors in Equation (44) may be 
divided to obtain: 
where 
MU, = -MRS2 i = l2l... 






The Expansion Path 
For the Cobb-Douglas function where the output requires 
two variable input factors, x1 and ~ , then 
(48) 
and the 
if: b a b-1 
MRS = dx, = ~ = - x, ~-Xi~ ~ a-1 b 
O X1 a X1 X2 
(49) 
MRS b & = 
X1 Jee a ~ 
(50) 
Equation (50) then represents the equation for the expansion 
path of input factor combinations to produce utility at the 
least cost. The equation of the expansion path is a linear 
function and goes through the origin. 
An Example of a Minimum Cost Solution 
Given that: 
Cost of output = C = P1 X1 + P2 ~ (51) 
where 
p1 = input price, x1 
p2 = input price, x2 • 
Quantity to be produced= 10 units. 
Then, if 
For the budget line constraint 
which is derived from Equation (51). 
The slope of the constraint line= 
Now, for the utility production function 





= ~ 3 q-l . 
z --
3. q 
'Z -'2 x = q"' ~ 0 




















is, the expansio~ path 0£·. in;pu.t.$.:·or.·t:be' input cost minimizing 
function. 









q = xi' Xz3 
i 1 
dn 2 . · 3 3 
~ =-;x Xz 
1 1 - -X13 Xz :, - 2 X1 = -!. 2 Xz i ... ' :, 
Xz' - X1 :, 
for the least cost equation. 
From Equation (61) 
= -2 













q = X1 3 X23 
q = 10 units required 
Pi = $2.00 
p2 = $4.00 
i :2 
X1 3 x?·· = 10 
X1 = 10 ; ~ = 10. 
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(66) 
Let Z = p 1 x 1 + p2 ~ + ••• + p x + FC + A [ q . - q ( Xi , ~ , .• ••. , xm .. ) ] n n. . . · o 
(67) 
where 
FC = fixed costs 
q0 = output quantity, 
then 
az + Aq' Cx1) 0 
~ = Pi = 
(68) 
oz + A.q'(~) 0 a~ ::; P2 = 





-:r- = qo - q(x1 ' Xe ' ••• xn)'. 01\. 
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(69) 
Then, the minimum cost to produce 10 utility units is 
C = $2(10) + ($4)(10) = $60. 




An Example - Producing a Given Utility Output 
for a Minimum Price 
Z = P1' X1 + P2 X2 ' • • • ' Pn + FC. + A [ qo - q ( X1 'Xe ' • • • ' ~) 
(70) 
FC;::; fixed cost 
qc = required output. 
az 
· - =. Pi. + A q '(x1 ) = 0 . ·. o Xi · 
c . 
- = 30 
P1 
.£:. = 15 
p 1 
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Expansion path x = y · 
1 2 




Figure 12 •.. The Expansion Path. 'for Minimum Cost 
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a°~= P2 +Aq'(~) = 0 
~ = p + A q '(x ) = 0 .ox n n n . 
If the utility function is given as 
where 
qo = 16 
P1 = $2 
P2 = $8 




~ = 16 - X1 "~ i = 0 . (74) 







t t 16 - ( 4x2 ) (x2 ) = 0 
2Xz = 16. 
Minimum cost= (32)($2) + (8)($8) = 128. 
An Example - The Maximization of Residue 
of Output-Input Utility 
If total utility output is represented by: 
and if the residue utility is represented by 
or 






d~TU02 = P1 + P2 & = 0 (79) dq1 dq1 
or 
~ = - El.. = MRS (80) dq1 P2 ~ ql, 
or since 
Pi q1 = -P2 ~ + TUO (81) 
ql TUO - :Qi ~ (82) = P1 P1 
or 
£:Sh. = - 122. = o. (83) d~ P1 
And, it is obvious that Equation (82) represents the linear 
equation of the output mix utility given some level of TUO. 
The next step is to locate the point of tangency for 
optimum production of utility. 




X = a common resource input 
and 
x1 = input for q1 and ~ = input for ~ • 
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And, since the x3 exponents for q1 and~ are< 1, disecono-
mies of scale result; i.e., diminishing returns are present. 
From Equations (84) and (85) 
X1 = q21 
X2 = Sl:z 4 .. 
And, if the total resource available is X, then 
which reflects a utility production function. 
To maximize TUO, let 
To maximize TUO, then 
o (TUO) = X - q21 - .9.242 ' aµ 
and Equation (91) represents the equation for an input 
restraint. 











P1 = $8 
P2 = $2, 
then 
~ = $8;$2 
~ 
(94) 
and the expansion path of utilizing inputs is 
(95) 
If Xis assumed to be limited to 160 utility units of 
2 
input, then 160 - q21 - ~ = 0 
solving for q21 == 128 
ql == llo3 
Therefore, the maximum utility output for an input X0 800 
TUO = (8)(11.3) + (2)(11.3) = 123ol utileso 
If residual utility (RU) is to be maximized, for 
simplicity a single output factor is assumed, then 
where 
Since p[q'(x.)J = Marginal Utility Value, 
1 








MUV. = marginal utility value of the ith input factor 
1 
in terms of output value 
pi= cost of input in utiles 
and then 




For the General Case 
Output is represented by multiple output factors, input 
has a multiple of input factors, all represented by: 
The total function is stated as 
m 







The notation can be simplified to let q . = -x. ( j = 1, ·;o •• o,,. n) S+J J .. 
and rewrite Equation (105) 
(107) 
where 
m = n + s, and output levels of factors (q1 , .•• , qs) 
are positive and input levels (q q) are negative. 
s+ j ' · · · ' n 
Then maximization of the Residual Utility function 
m 
RU =I p . q. + A F ( q1 , • • • , q ) 1 1 m (108) 
i=l 
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= ( i = 1, ... , m) (109) 
oJ 
o A = F ( q1 ' . . • ' qm) = 0 ' (110) 
then setting any two of the first m equations equal to each 




pk = Fk = - oq." J 
(j, k = 1, ... , m) (111) 
which says that the MRS .q for any pair of output factors 
qk j 
must equal the negative inverse price ratio, or output 
utility ratio if all other inputs and outputs are held con-
stant. That is: MRS12 = - ]2z_. Now, if the jth variable 
P1 
is an input and the kth variable is an output, then if 







- == -1, dx. J-S 
(k = 1, ... , s) 
( j = s + 1, ... , m) 
(112) 
which says that the marginal productivity of an input with 
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respect to every output must be equated to its price, or 
= 
(~) PQ2 
Px .· .. 1 
= •• 0 = 1 ' 
(113) 
and this condition must hold for any one input used for the 
production of several output variables. This is the output -
input rule. 




The requirement is that the input utility price of i must 
equal j for optimal input-input allocation. This is the 
input - input rule. 
And, if i and j are outputs, then 
or 
or 






Then, if (MR.Sji) pj > pt, allocate more utility to produce 
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more q.; if (MRS .. ) p: < p1:, allocate more utility to pro-J .. J1. J 
duce less qj. This is the output-output rule. , 
Rule Summary 
In the output-input rule, the RU can be maximized, but 
there is no assurance costs are being minimized. 
In the input-input rule, cost is being minimized, but 
no assurance is given that RU is being maximized. 
In the output-output rule, RU is being maximized, but 
no assurance is given that costs are minimized. 
By using a combination of the input-input rule and the 
output-output rule, assurance can be obtained that utility 
output is maximized with a minimum of input so that 
~ . ~ ... 




output-input rule (116) 




:Jinput-input rule (117) 
Rule 3: : .output-output rule (118) 
where 
x = input factor 
y = output factor. 
By using Rules 2 and 3 above, the following is obtained: 
(119) 
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for any combination of j inputs and k outputs. 
Of particular interest is that Equation (119) can be 
discounted for future receipt of utility analogously to the 




(MRSY, Y2) Py, = (MRSx, X2) Px, = 1 
PY2 PXz (1 + UDR)n 
UDR= utility discount rate in decimal form. 
n = unit time before receipt of utility. 
CHAPTER VI. 
THE STABILITY AND INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS 
OF A UTILITY SYSTEM 
In Chapter V, methods of allocating utility resources 
were developed. This is only an identification of a por-
tion of the problem. Not only must the decision-maker allo-
cate utility to the individual contributors to the 
organization, but, ·in sum, he must have enough total utility 
to dispense. Essentially, for the organization to be stable 
it must have at least a sufficient supply of utility to meet 
the demand for utility made by the contributors. 
Equilibrium in the Supply and Demand 
.of Utility 
Equilibrium is characterized by the acquiescence of 
suppliers and. demanders of utility in the status quo: no 
participant in the exchange of utility has an incentive to 
modify the supply and demand-requirements of utility. The 
organization is stable - in equilibr~um - if supply and 
demand are equal. Unfortunately, the existence of an equi-
librium point' does not guarantee that it will be attained. 
There is no reason to assume that an initial exchange of 
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utility will happen to be the equilibrium point where the 
demand for ut;ili ty ·exactly equals the su~ply which the or-
ganization is willing and able to give up, indicated in 
Figure 13. In no more realistic fashion is this recognized 
than in Wage and Salary Administration w:µere a continued 
knowledgeable effort is required to assure that the labor 
force is in equilibrium with the organization's requirement 
for effort. Moreover, changes in the evaluation of utility 
preferences will generally shift the demand curve, and 
changes in the effectiveness with which the organization 
utilizes effort will shift the supply curve. Both of these 
types of changes tend to disturb the establi:shed eg_uilibrium.o 
The changes define a new equilibrium, but, again, there 
exists no guarantee it will be attained. 
Assumptions for Stability Under 
Dynamic Change 
If the condition exists such that the demand for util-
ity exceeds its supply, the assumption is made that an in-
crease in effort will be made to acquire more utility. 
In the organization, the contributors may exert tlris 
effort within the organization or affiliate with another 
organization. If the condition exists whereby more utility 
is supplied than is being demanded, then it will.be assumed·-_ 
that the organization will reduce the effort in generating 







(Note: This figures requires a specific interpretation as 
follows. The ability of an organization to gener-
ate an increasing supply of utility as additional 
effort is contributed is seen intuitivelye The 
demand for the utility which an organization dis-
penses to .its contributors is viewed, by the con-
tributor, from the.position that a large required 
effort input makes the contributor demand a small 
amount of utility from this organization.o The 
organization faces such a demand for the utility 
it may distributeo In practical terms, if an or-
ganization were to offer double the present start-
ing salary of any 0£ its competitors, the utility 
of such a salary wou1¢l. create a heavy demand by 
job applicants.) From an.other viewpoint~ if the 
required effort is large, the individual assigns 
less utility to the utility being offered by the 
organizationo 
Figure 13. Equilibrium of Utility Supply 
and Demand 
12.2 
A Digression on Difference Equations 
The use of difference equations is applicable to the 
study of dynamic stability, since decisions to modify input-
output relationships are assumed to be discrete as decisions 
extend over time periods. 
Discrete analysis over time periods is generally ide~-
tified as being suitable for manipulation by difference 
equations. 
Initially, a difference equation indicates changes 
taking place in a function as influenced by changes in the 
relevant time periods. 
For example, a growth rate equation is represented by: 
where 
U -U 
C == 100 ( ;t. t-1:) 
ut-1 
C = change in total utility in per cent 
Ut = total utility at time t 
Ut-l = total utility in the preceding time period. 
Thus, stipulating at utility growth rate of five per 
cent· per time perio.d. ~equals 
U -U · · 
5 ,;, 100 (--1~::1:)·. . . u . . . . . t .. 









By repeated multiplication of Equation (4), it is pos-
sible to obtain: 
and, in general 
Ut = At-lU1 f t 1 2 3 or = , , , ••• (5) 
Equation (5) is the solution for Equation (4). Since 
Equation (4) relates the dependent variable, U, in terms of 
different time periods, it is called a difference equation. 
Since the lag in time periods is one period, it is called a 
first order difference equation. 
In general, a difference equation involves a function F 
of a dependent variable U and an integer variable t., which 
is represented by 
(6) 
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where the difference equation is said to be of the kth order 
when the maximum difference of the subscripts of U are equal 
to k. It is linear when the dependent variables appear to 
no higher power than one. It has constant coefficients when 
all the coefficients of U are constants. 
The general nth order linear difference equation with 
constant coefficients is written as 
U(t) = CX1 U(t - 1) + CX2 U(t - 2) + 0 •• + cxnU(t - n) + f(t) 
where 
cxi = a constant for each lag period (i = 1, 2, ... , n) 




t = 1, 2, 3, 
0 0 0 ' 
where Equation (8) represents the general first order dif-
ference equation with constant coefficients. 
Now, it can be said Ut is a particular solution of 
Equation (8) if it satisfies the equation for all permis-
sible values of to 
For example, Ut = 20cxt is a particular solution of Ut = 
cxUt-l since, by substitution, 
(9) 
And, in fact, there is a :wh~.le family of particu,lar 
solutions identified by 
where 
u = ka.t 
t 
k = an arbitrary constant, 




A particular solution is obtained by the specification 
of k. The specific value of k is determined from the ini;.... 
tial condition; i.e., the value of Ut for the first period 
considered. 
For example, from Equation (4), the general solution is 
for 
t = 1, 2, 3 . . . (12) 




k - 1h. - ex. ' (14) 
so the general solution may be represented by 
., .... en)· t 
Vt :;: . ~ c: = U t-1 l or. • 
While the above solution has been demonstrated for 
clarity, an easier method is presented. 
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(15) 
First, let f(t) ~ 0 in Equation (8). The result is 
identified as the homogeneous form of Equation (8) and is 
represented by 
(t = 1, 2, 3, ... ) (16) 
where 
u = the dependent variable in the homogeneous equation. 
(35). 
The general solution is found as 




Ut is a particular solution of Equation (8). 
That is, Ut is a function of t that satisfies the. _equation 
(19) 





If k~t is subtracted from both sides of Equation (21) 
(22) 




is a solution to Equation (8) and, since it contains an arbi-
trary constant k, it is a general solution. 
If, in determining future utility levels Ut, the condi-
tion is Ut = U0 fort= O, then k can be determined. To 





The Use of Difference Equations in 
Stability Analysis 
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The analysis of stability is done for a one period lag 
in adjusting to the demand for a supply of utility made by 
the contributors to the organization. Essentially, the 
decision-maker would like to obtain and maintain equilibrium 
in the supply and demand for utility. He may be concerned 
about fluctuations taking place; in one period an under sup-
ply of utility may cause a response that will over compensate 
for such shortage. 
Taking into account a one-time period adjustment cycle, 
the demand and supply of utility can be represented as 
D = demand for utility, UD 
S = supply of utility, US 
where each, respectively, are effected by the effort re-
quired to obtain and produce utility, then 
where 
Et= effort in current period 
Et-l = effort in prior period. 
(26) 
Essentially, the decision-maker questions, "Did I 
supply enough utility last period to satisfy the demand for 
this period; if I didn't, perhaps my supply of utility needs 
to be adjusted." 
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It is assumed that the demand and supply functions are 
linear where effort (E) is the variable. Then 
D = A + aE 
S = B = bE 
or Equation (26) can be rewritten 
A+ aEt = B + bEt-l• 
Then 
b B- A 
Et = - E + ---a t-1 a ' 
the homogeneous form is et b = a Pe-1 
where 
b 
ex. = a ' and f(t) = 
B-A --a 





Pt = k ( ~) is the general solution, and ( 30) 
the particular solution Et of Equation (28) is assumed to be 
constant, say E = C; then, substituting in Equation (8) 
Cb) B ... A c = a c + a 
B - A 
a B-A 






E = (33) 
and the general solution is 
(34) 
If the effort, E, at t = 0 is given as E , then from Equa-
o 
tion (28), the solution is 
(35) 
It is assumed that the demand for utility is inversely 
related to the effort required to obtain utility; that is, 
a contributor is a utility maximizer with limited effort 
~esources. Then the utility demand function has a negative 
slope as in Figure 14; i.e., a< O. The slope of the util-
i ty supply function is positive, b > 0, since the decision-· 
maker reasons that the acquisition of utility requires an 
expenditure of effort by the contributors to the organiza-
tion. Then, Equation (35) exhibits three types of 
alternation: 
Alternate 1: 1~1 > 1. Then b < la1, then the 
magnitude of ( ~) t increases in-
definitely as t ..... 00 • This explosive 
situation is shown in Figure llJ-. 
The organization will never achieve 
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Ufort I Utility Supply Output~ 
- Supply = B + bE 
Demand = A + ap 
Utility e-
Pigure 14. An Explosive System 
EffOrt f Utility Supply -....___ . Output · . · -..,.. 
·~---..-----=2.,,.,·. ~ Supply = B + bE 
~ --- A+aE 
a I 
I I 
I Utility temand -fi> 
8 . Inpu 
I • I I 
I ' I • I I 
u1 u2 u3 Utility .... 
Figure 15. A Dynamically Stable System 
132 
stability in the allocation of utility. 
Alternate 2: l~I = 1. Then b = !al and both the 
supply and demand utility functions 
have the same absolute slope and regu-
lar alternation will result from too 
much utility in one period to too lit-
tle utility in the next periodo The 
fluctuation can never be accommodated 
in this situation. 
C ;'\ t Alternate 3: \ti< 1. Then, b > \al and. ~) will 
dec.rease in magnitude as t increases; 
I S'I t =+ 0 as t .... 00 • This indicates a 
damped alternation in the supply and 
demand of utility which will tend to 
bring the situation to a equilibrium 
state (Figure 15). 
Using Figure 14, a detailed explanation of the explo-
sive condition is developed. First, assume that the supply 
of utility does not equal the equilibrium quantity. The 
reason may be r~flected in attrition rates higher than can 
be attributed to chance causes alone. At U21 the level of 
effort E2 faced by the contributor represents his demand for 
organization utility. If the effort is at a high level, the 
utility demand is low since effort and utility both account 
for the attractiveness in contributing to the organization. 
i 
The manager facing this E2 level of effort recognizes that 
if he possessed this level of effort in the next period 9 the 
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utility level would increase to U1 • And, if he produces 
this level of utility, there is an increased demand for it 
by the contributors. Their demand increases from U2 to U3 • 
At utility level U2 , the manager recognizes a lowered effort, 
E1 , which requires that he reduce his utility supply to U1 
in this second period. Such a reduction in utility output 
is recognized by the contributors who match the reduction by 
reasoning that the scarce utility increases their effort in 
an attempt to obtain it. Hence, the effort level rises to 
E3 at which point the manager anticipates in the next period 
he has the effort capability to produce a U4 level of util-
ity. The cycle continues and explodes since equilibrium 
will never be reached. 
Using Figure 15,, again assuming supply does not equal 
the equilibrium quantity, rather it equals U1 , the corre-
sponding effort that contributors are willing to contribute 
is E3 at point 1 on the demand curve. The amount of de-
manded utility equals the available supply U1 • The corre-
sponding effort E3 and E1 are not equal. The manager 
reasons that more utility from this firm will be demanded as 
the effort requirement is reduced. (Note: This statement 
is not to be construed as saying that the contributor will 
not demand more utility as his effort increases, for he 
will. The contributor is being viewed here not from his in-
dividual position of a supplier of effort, but rather a 
demander of utility.) The effort, E3 , that contributors are 
willing to contribute is viewed as "If you require a great 
deal of my effort, I don't want very much of the utility you 
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have to offer. 11 The effort~ E:~~ permits the manager to sup-· 
ply U3 in the succeeding period of activity. He reasons that 
if E:~ were available, U3 could be supplied to the contribu·= 
tors. However, the contributors view this new level of util-
ity, U3 , as very attractive and all of it is_demanded by 
contributors who drop the effort level to E1 • The manager 
recognizes a decrease in effort which reduces the organiza= 
tion I s utility supply to U2 in the next period. At the util-
ity supply level~ U2 , effort E2 is required by the supply 
curve and the demand for this level of utility is instantly 
recognized on the utility demand curve wherein the contribu-
tor reasons that "If the organization increases, the effort 
demanded of me, then I want less of its utility in this sec-
ond period. 00 This adjustment continues until equilibrium. is 
reached. 
The lagged analysis in the fore going development for the 
stable and explosive systems has been represented to show the 
organization lagging the demands of the contributorso Where 
an explosive system exists~ stability can be generated if the 
organization will lead the demands of the contributors. 
Given the eguiprobable chance of each type of al terna-· 
tion occurring, it is readily apparent that if stability is 
an objective of a manager, and the organization exists in a 
competitive environment~ stability is an elusive goal. 
Given the chance occurrence of Alternate 1, 2, or 3, it is 
quite likely, if the survival of an organization is conting-
ent upon stability 9 then 0.666 of all organizations will 
fail due to chance. This is not an uncommon observation in 
organization survival rates. 
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Input-Output Analysis 
In the analysis of a sector of an organization to de-
velop insights into its behavior, Leontief's (36) technique 
of input-output analysis seems desirable and appropriate. 
The technique seeks to take account of general equilibrium 
phenomena in the empirical analysis of production. The type 
of analysis proposed deals with the production and consumption 
of utility. Demand theory plays no role in the hard core of 
input-output analysis. The problem is essentially techno-
logical. This portion of the investigation.seeks to deter-
mine what amount of utility can be produced, and the 
quantity of utility which can be consumed in the production 
processes, given the quantities of available resources and 
the state of technological development. 
Descriptive Input-Output Activity 
Input-output analysis seeks to take account of the 
interdependence of the resources which consitute an identi-
fied organization. The interdependence arises out of the 
fact that each contributor employs the outputs of other con-
tributors as its input resource. Its output, in turn, is 
often used by other contributors as a productive.input fac-
tor; sometimes by the very contributors from which inputs 
were obtained initially. 
As an example, the contributor on the assembly line 
builds a car; the car is the input for sales, sales output 
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is sales revenue which is the input to the accounting de-
partment; accounting output is a paycheck for the contribu-
tor on the assembly line; accounting output is also a 
1 
paycheck for the salesman and a paycheck for the accountant; 
accounting output may also go to surplus fundso 
The basic problem is to see what can be left over for 
final surplus utility and how much of each contributor's 
output will be used up in the course of the productive ac-
tivities which must be undertaken to obtain these net util-
ity outputso Most significantly, it can be used for 
organization planning in the sense, for example, of deter-
mining what contributor or group of contributors consume 
less utility than they produce as viewed by the decision-
makero 
Essentially, then, input-output analysis is an empiri-
cal technique developed by Leontief (36) as a method of 
determining interdependence among various sectors of an 
organizationo In contrast, to the normative characteristic 
of most economically oriented analysis, input-output is 
mainly positive in nature. Rather than to predict what 
ought to be, given specified objectives and means, it 
mainly describes conditions as they existed at a particular 
point in time. The conditions explained are largely the 
interdependence coefficients among the various producing 
sectors of an organization. The interdependence coeffi-
cients computed can be used then to predict utility output 
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and input in various sectors of the organization under dif-
ferent conditions of demand. 
Most work in input-output analysis has been in terms of 
open models or systems. A system is said to be open if 
vectors are not included in the flow, input-output, and 
interdependence matrices which relate all sectors to each 
other. An open system is represented by an autonomous sec-
tor which does not have flows back to the producing sectors. 
An open system represents the .possibility of a surplus of 
produced utility. In a closed system, these final utility 
demands would be included in the flow tables; i.e., surplus 
utility would be non-existent. In this analysis, an open 
model approach has primary considerations. 
A major interpretative problem of input-output analysis 
relates to the fixed-mix characteristics of inputs and out-
puts of the various sectors. For diagnostic and highly 
aggregated types of analyses, these limitations may be no 
more severe than for alternative empirical procedures as 
discussed in Chapter V. 
The strength of input-output analysis permits the 
establishment of interdependence of sector utility output 
and consumption as it relates to total utility demand within 
the organization. 
The Input-Output Model 
The data for Leontief-type input-output analyses re-
quires that the organization under consideration be divided 
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into relevant groups or sectors. In parallel terminology, 
each of these sectors can be viewed as an activity. These 
sectors or activities are interdependent because some use 
the outputs from other sectors. Output from each of the 
sectors is designated 
where 
n = the total number of sectors 
and 
X1 = total utility output from sector 1. 
Final utility demands are represented by demands, Ui, made 
by autonomous sectors, and represents available surplus 
utility in the sense that the quantity for any one demand 
sector does not depend on the magnitude of any other Ui 
quantity. 
Quantities of intersector utility flows are designated 
as Xij' denoting the quantity of utility moving from the ith 
producing sector to the jth consuming sector. Final demand, 
Ui, indicates the amount of utility which does not move be-
tween sectors, but moves into final surplus utility. The 
total utility output includes total utility production from 
the respective producing sectors within the organization. 
The Model 
In matrix form, the model appears as: 
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Final Total·· 
Consuming. Sectors Surplus Utility 
Utility Output 
1 2 . . . ·, j ... ,.,,,,i, n u. xi J. 
1 X11 X12 . . . x· :· lJ . . • Xm, u1 X1 




..p 0 • . . . . . . • 0 • 
() . . • Q) • 0 . . 0 
r.Q . . . . . . . . 0 
bO 
A i u~ x. ,,-f Xi1 Xi2 . •• x .. 0 0 0 x. 
(.) J.J in J. J. 
p 
rd 
0 • . • . . . . . . o,, . H 
P-i . • . . . 0,0 0 . • . . . • . . . . . . 0 • 
' 
n Xl).1 Xm . . . xnj • • 0 xnn u n xn 
n· 




In matrix notation: 
X1 U1 
z = x = 0 u = .. 
• -0 
• 







z:;i: + u = x 
X - ZI = U. 
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Input-output coefficients equal: 
where 
x12 = a12 ~ means that the total quantity of output 
from sector 1 used by sector j = the amount of 
sector 1 output used per unit of outpµt from 




-821 0 0 0 e . . . . . . . 
.. 
... ai1 . . . . . . . . . . . 













when all a .. = l; that is when i = j, one utile of output 
11 
from a particular sector is required for each utile of input 
to this same sector. 
Al 1 th · t 1 f t t f the 1' th o er a1 j represen va ues o ou pu rom 
sector required to prodµce one utile of product in the jth 
consuming sector. 
To .relate output of one sector to quantiti~s of demand 




the matrix of input-output coefficients. 
Then 
AX = U 
X = UA-l 
where A-l is the inverse matrix defined as 
Then 
= 
. . . 
. . . 
c nn 
c nn u n 
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The element c11 indicates the amount by which output of 
sector 1 will change as final u.tili ty demand for. th.e 
output of this sector is increased by one utile. Or, cij 
expresses the amount of utility from sector i used per 
utile of final demand for the product from sector j. 
An Example - Input-Output Analysis 
To demonstrate the foregoing with an elementary analy-
sis, assume a simple economy of three sectors: finance, 
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manufacturing, and sales. Utility output of the sectors is 

























Sector 2 consumes 100 utiles of output from sector 1 
Sector 3 consumes 40 utiles of output from sector 1. 
Final demand for utility output from sector 1 is 360 
utiles; i.e., exogeneous demand is 360 utiles. Total out-
put from sector 1 = 500 utiles. 
The matrix of input-output coefficients is 
Producing Consuming Sector 
Sector 1 2 3 
1 1 -0.5 -0.1 
2 -0.2 1 0 
3 -0.1 -0.4 1 
utility flow from sector 1 to sect~r 2 
= total utility output of sector 2 
lOO 5 th t" · · ff' d t = 200 = • , e nega 1ve sign is a 1xe o 
conform to previous equation manipulation. 
The interdependence coefficient is: 
since 












1 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
\A\= 1 + .5 [ ··10 ] [-0. 2 
-0.41 -0.1 
o] [-0.2 - 0.1 
1 -0.1 




















The interdependence coefficients are: 
Producing Consuming Sector 
Sector 1 2 3 
- . 
1 1.1333 0.6122 0.1133 
2 0.2267 1.2244 0.0226 
3 0.1020 0.5102 1.0204 -· 
. X1 = l.1'.,4U1 + 0.61U2 + 0.11U3 
' - Xi = 0. 23U1 + 1. 22U2 + 0 .023U3 
. X3 = 0.10U1 + -o •. 51u2 + l.02U3 
which can be ;i.nterpreted as: 
X1 = (1.134)(360) + 0.61(100) + 0.11(270) = 500 
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or interpretatively;$ if. final utility demand U1 increases by. 
one utile, X1 output mu.st be increased by 1.134 utiles 
since the utility demands have measured the demands on X1 by 
other industries in the input-output coefficient matrix. 
If final utility demands for surplus, U3 , increases by 
one utile, X1 utility output increases by 0.11 utile. 
If a utile of final demand for sector 2 utility exists, 
then an output of 0.61 utile is required from sector 1 to be 
consumed by sector 2 to produce one utile- of sector 2 output. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The study covered in the prior chapters was successful 
in several aspects. Possibly the most c~allenging develop-
ment was the exploration of an integrating tool to allow the 
current concepts of organization theory and microeconomic 
theory to be applied in a particular manner to allow the 
decision-maker to acquire and distribute utility to insure 
the survival of the organization. 
A Classification of the Decision Environment 
The decision-maker is faced with three distinct deci-
sion environments given that he .has an ability to weigh un-
certain events. These are: 
1. The decision environment to allocate utility 
resources to individual contributors so as 
to optimize the return from such expenditures. 
2. The decision environment to allocate utility 
resources in accordance with constraints im-
posed by the environment of limited resources. 
3. The decision environment to stabilize the 
supply and demand for utility. 
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Each of these three environments are interdep~ndent on 
. . 
the assumption that objective measures of utility are pos-
sible. If they are, the structure of the organization 
becomes better identified. It becomes better identified as 
the decision-maker can be brought closer to the point of 
recognizing what various sectors of the organization con-
tribute towards its survival. 
The technique of input-output analysis demonstrates 
that a operational scheme is available to evaluate the con-
tributory effect of each sector of an organization. The 
sector interdependency in generating a_surplus of utility 
allows the organization to examine sectors; e.g., Plant A, 
the Accounting Department, Production Department, ot-:t.he 
Research Laboratory, from the point of view in determining 
where scarce resource allocation may be most beneficial to 
the entire organization. While admittedly a theoretical 
tool, input-output analyis would aid in developing an objec-
,. 
tive measure of the utility contribution mad:e to the organi-
zation by the various sectors. 
The general weakness in any of the approaches derived 
is the lack of empirical application of these quantitative 
techniques. The advance of knowledge hopefully precedes its 
application. In a number of areas, isolated use has been 
made i:mplicitly of many of these techniques. There appears 
to be no currently applied ordered body of knowledge to 
integrate these techniques into fruitful application. As 
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mentioned earlier, the developments indicate certain methods 
by. which managers may be able to analyze not only_ their 
objectives, but the route by which these objectives may be 
achieved. The tools of analysis seem at the stage of devel-
opment similar to the early stages of development of non-
stochastic inventory control. .Much theoretical work remains 
to be done to present these techniques as workable tools of 
management. Some of the current obstacles have been cited. 
It remains now for refinements to take place in developing 
utility functions and the function~l relationships within an 
organization to relate the supply and demand,of utility. 
As a further observation developed through the research 
effort devoted to this thesis, an inordinate amount of time 
was necessary to assure as complete knowledge of the appli-
cation of utility theory to the decision-making environment 
as might be possible. As cited in the final chapter, the 
extensions of this work seem possible in several distinct 
areaso It has been the intention in this work to vrovide a 
consistent and documented basis from which further research 
may proceed. Accordingly, the literature search conducted 
in completing this thesis should be helpful in providing a 
concise reference source for those who wish to proceed in 
advancing research activity in the application of utility 
theory in the managerial decision-making process. 
CHAPTER VIII 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
The recommendations for further investigation can be 
identified in a number of distinct areas, all of which re-
quire ultimate regard for the adaptability of these tech-
niques by the individual who is responsible for allocating 
resources to achieve certain objectives. 
Extension of the investigation is to determine what sur-
vival mechanism is utilized by the manager; i.e., what sat-
isfies the short-run f:llld long-run goals for survival. A 
number of elements can be considered, such as attrition 
rates, comparative financial and physical productivity 
ratio analysis, and comparative growth rates that have never 
been given adequate attention in assessing stability. 
The most relevant weakness found in this study is the 
abstract relation that is given probability theory. 
Subjective probability distributions many times are viewed 
as unrelated to decision patterns of the manager. Research 
in this area is bringing theoretical probability theory to 
the level of interpretative application by a decision-maker. 
The results of informal empirical tests with students ex-
posed to instruction in probability theory indicate even 
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they have difficulty in deciding among probabilistic 
alternatives. 
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The development of utility productio'n functions has 
been done on a limited basis. Investigations would prove 
fruitful in developing physical production functions for 
organizations. A bare minimum of work has been done in this 
area. Such studies are a forerunner of the development of a 
utility production functiono 
Since personal utility preference functions have been 
developed, it would be an outstanding contribution if the 
technique of factorial analysis could be applied to contrib-
utors of an organization. Ordinal surveys of preferences 
are widely circulated, yet no attack has been made on 
attempting the identification of interaction coefficients 
associated with contributory effort. 
A feasible extension of input-output analysis would 
see~ to be in the area of lagged i~terdependence coeffi-· 
cients to show change of utility during prog~essive time 
periods. The transitional states might well be examined 
through the Markov process. The value of such an investiga-
tion would be to identify and manipulate a dynamic input-
output model in terms of resource (labor and capital) 
allocation to achieve resource investment criteria in the 
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